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ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on the development of routing algorithms for secure and
trusted routing in wireless ad hoc and sensor network.
The first paper presents the Trust Level Routing (TLR) protocol, an extension of
the optimized energy-delay routing (OEDR) protocol, focusing on the integrity, reliability
and survivability of the wireless network. TLR calculates the link costs based on a
composite metric (delay incurred, energy available at the neighbor node, energy spent
during transmission and the number of packets sent on each link) for the selection of
MPR nodes.
The second paper analyzes both OLSR and TLR in terms of survivability and
reliability to emphasize the improved performance of the network in terms of lifetime and
proper delivery of data. The goal is to explain analytically the achieved improvements in
the energy consumption and its effect on the survivability and reliability.
The third paper proposes a statistical reputation model that uses the watchdog
mechanism to observe the cooperation of the neighboring nodes. This model uses the
Beta distribution as a basis for calculating/updating the trust value by applying the
moment matching method for parameter estimation.
The last paper presents the results of the hardware implementation of EnergyEfficient Hybrid Key Management. This study serves two purposes; first, it identifies the
effects of hardware constraints on the overall performance of the protocol. Secondly, it
gives a foundation for the improvement of the simulators.
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PAPER

I. Optimal Energy-Delay Routing Protocol with Trust Levels for Wireless Ad Hoc
Networks

Eyad Taqieddin, S Jagannathan, Ann Miller

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Missouri – Rolla
Rolla, Missouri 65409
{eyad,sarangap,milleran}@umr.edu

Abstract
This paper presents the trust level routing (TLR) protocol, an extension of the
optimized energy-delay routing (OEDR) protocol [1], focusing on the integrity,
reliability and survivability of the wireless network. TLR is similar to OEDR in that
they both are link state routing protocols that run in a proactive mode and adopt
the concept of multi-point relay (MPR) nodes. However, TLR aims at incorporating
trust levels into routing by frequently changing the MPR nodes as well as
authenticating the source node and contents of control packets. TLR calculates the
link costs based on a composite metric (delay incurred, energy available at the
neighbor node, energy spent during transmission and the number of packets sent on
each link) for the selection of MPR nodes. We highlight the vulnerabilities in OEDR
and show ways to counter the possible attacks by using authentication and traffic
partition as a basis for mitigating the effects of malicious activity. Network
simulator NS2 results show that TLR delivers the packets with a noticeable decrease
in the average end-to-end delay with a small increase in the power consumed due to
the additional computational overhead attributed to the security extension.

Keywords—Authentication,

Optimal Route, Energy, Delay.
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1.

Introduction

A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a group of wireless mobile nodes that form a
dynamic network topology without any centralized administration or fixed infrastructure.
The nodes mobility requires establishing and breaking connections whenever needed.
Each node communicates directly with the nodes within its wireless range. However, the
nodes need to collaborate together to deliver the information between nodes that are
beyond the wireless range of the source. With this approach, in terms of transmission,
each node operates in two modes; source or router. Source nodes generate the traffic on
the network whereas routing nodes receive the packets and forward them to the intended
destination.
A routing protocol is used to detect the topology of the network and to enable each node
to have a path to any of its intended destinations. The nodes use Link State Update (LSU)
packets to share information among each other to build their respective routing tables and
report any changes in network topology. The routing protocol should focus on energy
conservation to increase the lifetime of the nodes while choosing routes with the least
delay, jitter and congestion. Occasionally, the best routes for several sources, in terms of
delay, go through the same node whose energy gets consumed at a higher rate compared
to other nodes. This, eventually, leads to a premature loss of the battery of the node. A
more efficient approach is to route packets through paths that may have higher delays but
with more energy resources in order to extend the life time of the network. Another
important factor to be considered is the security of the communication among nodes. The
routing protocol should detect any attempt to change the LSUs in transit, reject fabricated
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routing messages, avoid the creation of routing loops that lead to denial of service attacks
and exclude all unauthorized nodes from the routing process.
The optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) protocol [2] was proposed with the
goal of reducing the flooding of routing messages in a network by designating specific
nodes to act as multi point relay nodes (MPR). The selection is based on the hop count.
The main drawback of OLSR is that it is not suitable for the dynamic link characteristics.
OEDR [1] targeted the energy-delay optimization in OLSR and resulted in better
performance in terms of end-to-end delay and energy efficiency. Both protocols,
however, are prone to various security threats that could impede their proper operation.
Security in ad hoc networks has been extensively studied and several security extensions
have been proposed for both reactive and proactive routing protocols. Some examples of
reactive routing include SAODV [10] which is an extension of AODV that verifies Route
Requests and Route Replies using digital signatures. Also, [15] present two approaches to
improve the security of DSR. The first approach is based on Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and the second is the Neighbor Set Detection (NSD). Each approach has an
advantage over the other. The PKI can prevent the use of fabricated routing messages. On
the other hand, the NSD does not depend on preexisting security mechanisms nor does it
depend on resource-expensive encryption and decryption operations. Simulation results
indicate a 95% probability of detecting a single attacker. As for proactive routing, the
work in [4] presented a basis for identifying various threats and suggested methods for
solving them using a key distribution mechanism. The idea is to use signatures and
timestamps with routing messages to avoid replay attacks. Another variation of secure
routing was given in [5], the secure link state routing (SLSP) is robust against individual
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Byzantine attackers but remains vulnerable to colluding attackers. The work in [17]
presents CSS-OLSR which ensures that the nodes in the network cooperate with each
other. The core of this scheme is the penalty/reward system in which a cooperating node
gets a higher rating whereas the nodes that refuse to cooperate receive a lower probability
of being selected as MPR nodes. In [11], a signature system for OLSR is proposed to
overcome the compromise of trusted nodes. When a trusted node is compromised, it can
inject false routing messages into the network while correctly signing them. The
suggested solution is to use the ADVSIG message which includes a timestamp and a
signature. When the ADVSIG is received, its contents are stored in a Certiproof table for
comparison with subsequent messages. A technique to mitigate the wormhole attacks is
presented in [12]. Here, the nodes advertise the hashes of the packets received within the
previous k intervals. A misbehaving node may be detected by comparing the packet
losses with a set threshold. Another algorithm to thwart wormhole attacks is given in
[13]. In this work, the nodes’ geographical location is embedded in a SIGNATURE
message. The extension is further fortified by the use of directional antennae instead of
omniscient ones to verify the direction from which the packet was received. However, the
disclosure of the nodes geographical location may prove harmful in situations where such
information needs to be concealed, e.g. military operations. One suggested solution is
ANODR [16], which addresses route anonymity and location privacy to prevent intruders
from detecting the identities of transmitting nodes or to trace a packet flow. ANODR
employs a loose definition of anonymity in which the identity of the destination is
disclosed to the intermediate nodes as well as the number of hops between any
intermediate node and the source. To overcome the effects of such loose definition, ASR
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[14] was proposed with the goal of providing identity anonymity and strong location
privacy. ASR provides identity privacy to both of the source and destination as well as
the ability to secure against multiple-to-one DoS attacks when compared with ANODR.
In this work, we extend the current definition of OEDR to include trust level. This is done
by adding authentication and traffic partition. With proper authentication, most of the
malicious packets can be ignored without affecting the proper routing. Traffic partition is
used to send the traffic in different paths with the aim of denying an intruder the chance
to capture the whole stream of communication.
The paper is organized as follows, in section two we present some of the security threats
in current link state routing protocols followed by a discussion of the operation of TLR in
Section 3. Section 4 details the implementation of trust levels. Sections 5 and 6 detail the
security and optimality analyses of TLR, respectively. Simulation results are given in
Section 7 and the paper is concluded in Section 8.
2.

Security Threats

A major focus is the security of the ad hoc network where the integrity of data is
essential. Due to the absence of a central authority for authentication, simple network
functions, such as packet forwarding, become susceptible to attacks as they are executed
by the nodes on the network instead of trusted centralized routers.
To introduce trust levels, a node must examine the trustworthiness of the nodes with
which it communicates before adding them to its routing table. The lack of authentication
can be a serious hazard to the proper operation of the routing protocol. OEDR does not
provide any security measures to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, availability and
authenticity of the data and proper routing. Because of this, malicious nodes can perform
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a variety of attacks to obstruct the communication on the network. It should be
emphasized, however, that the following vulnerabilities are inherent in all link state
routing protocols and do not represent faults in the initial design of OEDR.
2.1

Passive Attacks

In this form of attack, a node resides within the communication range of another node to
capture all the information sent. This vulnerability is especially harmful if the intruder is
within the range of the original source of traffic and can only be solved using encryption.
If, however, the eavesdropper resides within the range of an MPR and not the original
sender then the effect can be reduced by fragmenting the traffic into different paths.
One approach for traffic partition is to use the number of packets sent through each MPR
as a factor in calculating the cost of the link. As a result, with every packet sent, the cost
of the link will increase until a point is reached where another link has a lower cost and
the routing tables are updated to use a different MPR.
2.2

Active Attacks

These attacks can be categorized as fabrication, identity spoofing, modification, or
replay. Since routing functions are performed by the nodes within the network, carrying
out such attacks is easier which will result in worse consequences on the overall
performance of the protocol. Moreover, the node mobility adds complexity to the design
of a secure protocol. Following is an explanation of these attacks and their effect on the
routing protocol.
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2.2.1

Fabrication

In this form of attack, a node generates false HELLO or TC packets to cause changes in
the routing tables of the nodes. This could lead to routing loops or denial of service. For
the recipient, there is no way to verify the correctness of the data received.
Examples of such an attack include generating TC packets that contain either an
incomplete list of the MPR or a list of imaginary nodes. Another example involves the
false advertisement of bi-directional links to the nodes in its neighborhood which may
results in having it selected as the MPR. At that point, the intruder can either drop or
selectively forward the packets to the MPR selector. Finally, since the OEDR link cost
calculation depends on the reciprocal of remaining energy in the MPR candidate, an
adversary can sends a Hello packet showing that it has a large amount of energy
remaining in its battery. This misleads the recipient node to calculate a low cost for the
link and thus selects the malicious node as its MPR. At this point, all the traffic will be
routed through this malicious node which can either drop (denial of service), selectively
forward or change the contents of the packets.
2.2.2

Identity spoofing

Since no authentication takes place, a malicious node can masquerade as another node
(identity spoofing). When the neighboring nodes receive its Hello packets, they will be
misled to believe that the claimed node is within their range. Later on, the deluded nodes
will advertise themselves as the last hop to the intruder (which they mistakenly believe to
be the legitimate node). This would result in conflicting information in the network as
well as denial of service.

8
2.2.3

Modification

MPR nodes are responsible for forwarding the packets to other nodes. While doing that
task, a malicious MPR may change the payload or even change the destination field
before transmitting the packet to the next hop. Another form of modification is to change
the packet sequence number to match one that was previously used, resulting in a packet
drop.
2.2.4

Replay

A malicious node may hold copies of LSU packets that were sent earlier and retransmit
them at a later time to poison the routing tables of the recipients with incorrect routing
information. Although the destination nodes check the sequence number of any received
packet to avoid duplicates, replay attacks can succeed by simply changing the packet
sequence number to a higher value.
These attacks can render the OLSR and OEDR protocols ineffective. Security extensions
are necessary in order to ensure safe transfer of data which is discussed next.
3.

Trust Level Routing

TLR is a proactive link state routing protocol. Its operation is table driven through
periodically exchanging topology information with other nodes in the network. The
objective of the protocol is to give the same functionality of OEDR as well as providing
guarantees of the integrity, timeliness and authenticity of the packets. The proposed
protocol follows the lines of OEDR. However, the routing criteria differ for selecting the
MPR nodes. There are several metrics to be considered:
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Energy consumed per packet: For this metric, the best path is selected based on the least
consumed total energy. Any packet going from source n1 to destination nk through some
intermediate nodes will consume
k 1

Et   e(i, i  1)

(1)

i 1

where Et is the total energy consumed and e(i,

i+1)

is the energy consumed to send the

packet from ni to ni+1.
Delay per packet: Similar to the energy metric, the goal is to find the path with the least
total delay. For a packet going from node n1 to node nk through some intermediate nodes,
the total delay incurred is given by
k 1

Dt   d(i, i  1)

(2)

i 1

where Dt is the total delay and d(i, i+1) is the time that starts when a packet enters the queue
of node ni until it reaches the queue of ni+1.
It is worth mentioning that a trade off between the two metrics exists. For example, in the
network shown in Figure 1, assuming that the energy consumed per each link is equal,
and that node B is heavily congested such that
dA,D  dD,E  dE,C  dA,B  dB,C

(3)

Then according to the delay metric the route A, D, E, and C will be taken instead of A, B,
C. However, according to the energy metric
e A,D  e D,E  e E,C  e A,B  e B,C

(4)

Which implies that route A, B, C should be chosen.
Furthermore, by selecting only one of the two metrics, the paths will tend to be always
the same (assuming no mobility). As a result, some nodes will have high energy
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consumption while others will retain their energy. Such variance in node energy can
result in network partition. Thus we consider a third metric.

Figure 1. A simple ad hoc network consisting of 5 nodes.
Residual energy levels: This metric is used to guarantee that all nodes will have
approximately equal rates of consumption by using the nodes with the highest energy
levels. That is, the lower the remaining available energy in a node, the higher the cost of
routing through it. The cost in this case can be taken as the reciprocal of the residual
energy.
Traffic partition: This metric serves multiple purposes. First, less congestion and delay
will be incurred through the intermediate nodes. Second, a higher throughput will be
achieved because data packets are going through different paths. More importantly, the
traffic will be fragmented into multiple paths which can potentially reduce the ability of a
malicious node to capture the whole stream of traffic.
TLR depends on the following steps for proper operation: neighbor sensing, cost
calculation, MPR selection, broadcast of costs and routing table calculation.
The following notation will be used:
N: set of nodes in network
s: source node
d: destination node
N1(s): One-hop neighbors of node s
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N2(s): Two-hop neighbors of node s
MPR(s): The set of nodes selected as MPRs by node s (MPR(s)  N1(s) )
Px,y: Number of packets sent from x through MPR y.
Cx,y : cost of link between nodes x and y, where
C x,y  w1 * (Energyx y * Delayx y )  w 2 * Px,y

(5)

Ex: Available energy of node x
3.1

Neighbor Sensing

Each node maintains a table called the neighbor table that stores information about the
link status between the node and all its immediate neighbors. Information about the
delay, energy consumption on each link, two-hop neighbors accessible through the
immediate neighbors, the set of selected MPRs and the number of packets sent through
each MPR are also stored in the table. The table is populated using the HELLO messages.
Every node in the network periodically sends HELLO packets to all the nodes within its
transmission range. Each message contains a list of neighbors of the originator,
transmission time, energy level, and the amount of energy used for transmission.
When the message is received, an entry is added to the table (if one does not already
exist). The delay is calculated as the difference between the time of reception and time of
transmission (we make the assumption that the clocks are synchronized). Furthermore,
the energy consumption on the link is calculated in a similar manner by comparing the
energy level of the signal at the receiver to the level stamped in the HELLO message.
If the originator of the HELLO message has no entries in the neighbor table of the
recipient (i.e. it just moved into the vicinity of the recipient), then a reply will be sent
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back with information about all authentic nodes and the information associated with each
(as will be discussed in Section 4).
3.2

Cost Calculation

Since TLR bases the selection of MPRs on a composite metric that differs from that of
OLSR or OEDR, the MPR set chosen does not necessarily have to be identical for the
same network topology and conditions. Moreover, if the nodes are static, the MPR set for
nodes running OLSR will always be the same until one or more nodes lose their battery
power or the topology changes due to node mobility. In TLR, the MPR set is dynamically
changed more frequently compared to OEDR.
3.3

MPR Selection Algorithm


Initially the MPR set MPR(s) is empty.



First, find all the nodes in N2(s) that have a single neighbor in N1(s). Add these
nodes of N1(s) to the MPR set if they are not already in MPR(s). (Because there
are no other MPR candidates).



While there exists a node in N2(s) for which MPR node is not selected, do:
For each node in N2(s), with multiple neighbors from N1(s), select a neighbor
from N1(s) as multipoint relay node which results in minimum cost from s to the
node in N2(s), CMPR according to (5), and add it to the MPR set if it is not already
in MPR(s).

3.4

MPR and Costs Declaration

Every selected MPR will transmit LSU packets called the Topology Control (TC) packets
that contain information about the MPR node’s selector set (i.e. the nodes that have
selected the originator of the TC message as their MPR). The TC messages, which
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include the link costs between the MPR node and its selectors, are forwarded throughout
the network through MPR nodes only. When a node receives a TC message, it can use
the information to build a ‘topology table’, in which it stores the information about the
topology of the network and the associated link costs. An entry in the topology table
consists of the address of a destination (an MPR selector in the received TC message),
address of the last-hop node to that destination (originator of the TC message), and the
cost of the link between the destination and its last hop. It implies that the destination
node can be reached in the last hop through this last-hop node at the given cost. [3]
In Section 4, a deeper discussion of the contents of TC packets and how to maintain their
integrity is given.
3.5

Routing Table Calculation

For each node, a routing table is maintained to route packets to their destinations. Each
entry contains the destination address, next-hop address, estimated distance to destination
(in hops) and the total cost of the path from the source to the destination. For every
known destination, an entry is added to the routing table listing the next hops to be taken.
Our proposed protocol uses the least cost spanning tree method.
4.

TLR Implementation

With the vulnerabilities listed in Section 2, it is clear that the operation of OLSR and
OEDR would become ineffective in the presence of malicious nodes. The main
requirements of security, i.e. origin authentication, timeliness and ordering, and data
integrity are missing in the original implementations of both protocols. Every LSU packet
should hold enough information to clearly prove that it originated from the claimed
source. Furthermore, late control packets should be dropped to avoid replay attacks.
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Finally, a mechanism to detect any alteration of LSU en route is needed. In this work, we
propose two methods for adding trust levels in the routing protocol: traffic partition and
authentication.
4.1

Traffic Partition

In this method, the traffic transmitted from source A to destination B is routed through
different paths by continuously switching between different MPR candidates. This
provides confidentiality and forbids eavesdropping in the presence of a single
eavesdropping node. With this approach, each path contains only partial information of
the data stream. Consequently, an intruder will not be able to reconstruct the whole flow.
From (5), it is evident that as the number of data packets increases on a certain link, the
cost of using that link will increase until the total cost becomes higher than that of
another link. At this point, the MPR list of the source will be updated to force a route
change.
This scheme would not be sufficient, however, in the presence of multiple eavesdropping
nodes that may monitor the different selected paths and combine the data for analysis.
4.2

Authentication and Timestamps

Traffic partition provides a reasonable level of security when combined with a
lightweight encryption algorithm. It is helpful in reducing the risk of passive attacks by
limiting the ability of one intruder to analyze the data stream completely and in a timely
manner. However, it has little potential in overcoming or even detecting active attacks.
Authentication of the LSU source can be used to counter active attacks. Assuming that
the authentic nodes in the network have a mechanism for sharing the encryption keys,
node A uses the shared key and the contents of the LSU to calculate a Message
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Authentication Code (MAC) which is appended to the LSU packet. When node B
receives the packet, it calculates the MAC again using the same secret key and the body
of the received packet (excluding the MAC). Node B accepts the packet if the resulting
MAC equals the MAC field of the packet. If, however, a malicious node alters the
message but does not alter the MAC (because it does not have the secret key), then node
B can easily detect the changes in the packet and drop it.
This guarantees that the packet was sent by one of the authentic nodes because only they
have the shared key and that the payload of the control packet was not changed en route.
The scheme above, by itself, is not enough for authentication. Consider a scenario where
node A sends control messages to node B. Assuming that a malicious node M intercepts
the control message, it could wait for a random period of time and then retransmit the
same packet. When node B receives the replayed message, it checks the hash code and
accepts the packet as authentic. This will cause inconsistencies in the routing table of
node B.
Timestamps can be used to overcome this problem. Whenever a node sends a packet, it
adds the time of transmission as a field and includes that in the MAC calculation. This
enables the recipients to check the time of transmission.
We propose the use of one way hash functions to create a hash chain analogous to that
given in [6]. The main characteristic of a hash function is that it is easy to compute in the
forward direction but computationally infeasible to find its inverse. That is, given g =
h(y) where h is the secure hash function whose input is y, then it is easy to find g given y.
However, the reverse process of finding ý such that h(ý ) = g is too expensive to be
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practical. A third condition to be satisfied is it is difficult to find two values x and y such
that h(x) = h(y), but x ≠ y.
In this method, every node selects a random seed value S and computes g1 = h(S) then it
computes the next value in the chain as g2 = h(g1). The whole sequence of hash values is
computed iteratively until the last value of the chain is given.
g1  h (S) , g i  h(g i -1 )

(6)

where 2 < i ≤ m and m is the length of the sequence.
The source node, A, starts using the hash chain in the backward direction (i.e. it starts
with gm followed by gm-1 , gm-2 … etc). If a receiver knows the value of gi (where 2 < i ≤
m) and has guarantees that it is authentic then the next packet coming from node A can
be checked for authenticity because it must be stamped by gi-1. The receiver needs to
check that
4.3

h(gi-1) = gi as a proof of authenticity.

Secure Broadcast of gm

We assume that every node in the network has a mechanism to verify the public keys of
all other nodes. We further assume that all the clocks of the nodes are synchronized (this
assumption is needed for the proper calculation of delays in the OEDR protocol). It is
worth mentioning that the use of public key cryptography is only applied on the control
packets which comprise a smaller part of the whole packets being communicated.
The broadcast of the last calculated value in the chain gm is done using a new packet
called the Chain tip packet. The format of the packet is shown in Figure 2.
The packet has four fields; the identifier of the sending node, a timestamp, the current
iteration (CI) field (which must be initially set to zero), and the last field that holds the
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encrypted value of the concatenation of the previous three fields and gm. When the packet
is received, it will be decrypted using the public key of the sender.
EKU [C] = EKU [EKR[ Node ID || timestamp || Chain Length (m)|| gm ]
= Node ID || timestamp || Chain length (m) || gm
Node ID
Timestamp
Current iteration (Zero)
C = EKR[ Node ID || timestamp || Chain Length (m) || gm ]
Figure 2. Chain tip packet format.
After decryption, the Node ID field will be compared with the decrypted value to make
sure that it originated from the claimed source. The timestamp field proves that the
message is “fresh” and that it is not a replayed message. The chain length field informs
all recipient nodes about how many iterations of the hash function had been calculated to
construct the chain, thus allowing them to know when the last value in the chain has been
reached. Finally, gm will be stored in the memory along with its associated Node ID.
Note, however, that any node that moves into the neighborhood after gm has been
delivered will not be able to authenticate the received packets. This can be solved by
introducing a Hello_response packet that is sent back from every node that receives the
HELLO packet. (Refer to Section 3.1).
The Hello_response should contain the same information given in the Chain tip packet
with the only difference that the CI field will be set to the number of chain elements
already received. For example, if a node received gm, gm-1, …, gm-i , then it will set the CI
field to hold the value of i before transmitting the Hello_response packet. Thus, the
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originator of the HELLO packet will receive the same information that it would have
received through a chain tip packet and will also have proof that it was indeed sent from
the claimed source (No other node can forge it). Furthermore, by knowing the CI field,
the node can check for the authenticity of the any TC packet it receives by calculating the
hash function on the received chain value i+1 times.

h i 1 (g m -i-1 )  g m

(7)

After that, the new node will have all the information that is available to all other nodes.
To avoid multiple copies of Hello_response packets, each node waits for a random time
before replying back with its Hello_response while overhearing the responses of other
nodes. If any matching Hello_response packet is overheard then the node backs off and
does not transmit, otherwise it sends its own version of the Hello_response.
4.4

Broadcasting TC Packets

The main purpose of using authentication is to guarantee that the TC packet was
generated by the claimed source and that the contents were not changed in transit.
Following is a description of how the hash chain can be applied.


Select a new random seed and calculate the hash chain.



Broadcast gm



For 1 ≤ i < m



Find the message digest of the concatenation of the node ID, timestamp, message,
and gm-i



Transmit the node ID, timestamp, message and the calculated hash value.
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Wait for a set period of time to make sure that the TC message reached all
destinations in the network then transmit gm-i to update the current hash value
being used.



Increment i



If (i = m) then the chain has been consumed and a new chain has to be created
(step a.).



Otherwise, repeat step c. for the next TC packet.

When a node receives the TC packet, it has no way to calculate the message digest
because gm-i is not known yet. The node must wait until it receives the value of gm-i to
verify the authenticity and integrity of the latest received TC packet.
Note that this update packet must be received within a protocol specific period of time
after the TC packet to guarantee that none of the intermediate nodes held the TC packet
until gm-i was released. This is an essential condition without which any malicious node
can modify the contents of the packet and calculate a new message digest before sending
the TC packet followed by the value of gm-i. The recipient, in this case, will not be able to
detect the changes.
For that reason, the recipient node compares the current time with the timestamp. If it
finds that updating with the value of gm-i took more time than expected then it drops the
TC packet.
5.

Security Analysis of TLR

In this section, we analyze the ability of TLR to limit various attacks.
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5.1

Replay Attacks

An adversary may hold old copies of TC packets to transmit them at a later instance of
time. This would result in conflicting information in the routing tables since either the
topology or the MPR nodes would have changed. TLR mitigates this threat with the use
of a timestamp in packets which is further enforced by the hash chain.
5.2

Identity Spoofing and Link Spoofing

Identity spoofing involves a node using an ID that does not belong to it whereas link
spoofing attacks occur when a node sends out incomplete or forged information about its
links. The presence of the mechanism for verifying the keys of other nodes limits the
ability of an attacker to attempt identity spoofing. Furthermore, in normal cases, only the
packets signed by trusted nodes are accepted and all others are rejected thus a malicious
node can not run a link spoofing attack since it packets will not be accepted.
5.3

Modification Attacks

An adversary may change the contents of TC packets in an attempt to add, delete or alter
the entries of the routing tables. This may result in routing loops or dropped packets due
to incomplete routes. In TLR, modifying the contents of a TC packet will be detected
since the intruder has no access to the held hash value. A malicious node trying to relay a
modified TC packet will need to wait for that unknown hash value which would make it
too late for it to transmit its modifications since that packet would be dropped.
5.4

Passive Attacks

As mentioned earlier, a node may listen in to capture the data stream. If the node is
overhearing the source itself, then only encryption may protect the data. However, if the
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eavesdropper is positioned around one of the MPR nodes then TLR can be helpful by
partitioning the data stream through different paths. By doing so, the intruder will only
have a part of the data stream. With multiple cooperating intruders, the stream may be
gathered in full and the protection of encryption is the last line of defense.
It is implicitly assumed that all the nodes that were selected as MPRs would cooperate in
relaying the packets to the destination. In the case of a compromised node, some packets
may be dropped instead of being relayed. TLR can not detect this but due to its frequent
topology updates it may limit this attack by switching to different MPR nodes. The work
in [17] provides a protocol that addresses this problem in specific.
We give a comparison between TLR, SLSP [5], and CSS-OLSR [17] in Table 1. The
comparison is based on the ability of each of the respective protocols to successfully limit
the effects of an attack.
Table 1. Comparison between SLSP, CSS-OLSR, and TLR.
SLSP

CSS-OLSR

TLR

Replay

NO

YES

YES

Identity Spoofing

YES

YES

YES

Link Spoofing

YES

YES

YES

Modification

YES

YES

YES

Traffic Relay Refusal

NO

YES

YES

Evesdropping

NO

NO

YES

6.

Optimality Analysis of TLR

Theorem 1: Only authentic nodes can be selected as MPR nodes.

22
Each packet received is checked for authenticity of source and content. Non-authentic
packets are dropped by the recipient and no entries are made in the neighbor table.
Hence, non-authentic nodes do not qualify as MPR candidates.
Theorem 2: The MPR selection will result in a trusted optimal route between the source
and destination with added trust levels only if there are multiple MPR candidates.
Case I: If a node in N2(s) has only one neighbor from N1(s), then that single neighbor
will be selected as the MPR. This MPR will be selected always in an optimal route but
there will be no traffic partition.
Case II: If a node in N2(s) has multiple neighbors in N1(s), the MPR selection will follow
the cost function to determine the path with the least cost. Since the costs are dynamic
due to the nature of the network and traffic sent, the paths selected will be dynamic to
allow for traffic partition in addition to the energy-delay considerations.
Assume that a source node s that has multiple one-hop neighbors in N1(s) needs to reach
a node d in N2(s) that has multiple neighbor nodes n1 , n2 , …, nk (k>1) belonging to
N1(s). Let the cost to reach any of these neighbors from s be Cs,ni (i=1,2,…k) and the cost
to reach d from ni is given by Cni,d. The MPR node between s and d is selected as the
node ni with the minimum cost Min{(Cs,n1 + Cn1,d), (Cs,n2 + Cn2,d), … , (Cs,nk + Cnk,d)}. The
cost values of Cs,ni change frequently and a different MPR is selected. Consequently, the
MPR selection of TLR will result in trusted optimal routes with trust levels from s to its
two-hop neighbors in N2(s).
Lemma 1: All intermediate nodes on the trusted optimal path are selected as multipoint
relays by the preceding nodes on the path.
Proof: To be selected as an MPR, a node has to prove its authenticity, provide
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connection between the source node and its two-hop neighbors and have the lowest link
cost.
Case I: The node in N1(s) of the source node s, does not provide connection to any node
in N2(s).
In Figure 3, node n2 has no direct connection to node d. The two possible paths from s to
d are s-> n1 ->d and s-> n2-> n1 ->d.

Figure 3. Case I.
Considering the added delay and energy consumption, it is clear that n2 is not on the
optimal path from s to d.
Case II: The node n2 in N1(s) of the source s does not provide proof of authenticity to
any node in N2(s). Any packet received from it by any node in the N2(s) will be dropped.
Case III: There is a trusted optimal path from source to destination such that all the
intermediate nodes on the path are selected as MPRs by their previous nodes on the same
path.
In Figure 4, suppose that in an optimal path, s -> n1 -> n2 -> … -> nk -> nk+1 .-> … -> d,
both MPR and non-MPR nodes exist. Also, based on the result of Cases I and II, we
suppose that for each node on the path, its next node on the path is its one-hop neighbor,
and the node two hops away from it is its two-hop neighbor.
1) Suppose that on the optimal route, the first intermediate node n1 does not meet the
criteria for MPR selection by source s. However, n2 is the two-hop neighbor of s. Based
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on the basic idea of MPR selection, every two-hop neighbor of s must be covered by its
MPR set, then s must select another neighbor as its MPR. In this case, n1’ is selected as
the MPR to cover node n2.

Figure 4. Case III.
Since route s -> n1 -> n2 -> … -> d is a trusted optimal path then s -> n1’ -> n2 -> … -> d
is also a trusted optimal path. Thus, the MPR is a part of the optimal path.
2) Assume that on the optimal route s -> n1 -> n2 -> … -> nk -> nk+1 .-> … -> d, all the
nodes on segment n1 -> … -> nk -> are chosen as MPR by their previous node, we now
prove that the next hop node of nk is on the optimal route is an MPR.
Suppose that nk+1 is not an MPR of nk. Same as in the previous situation, nk+2 is the twohop neighbor of nk, so it must have another neighbor nk+1’ which covers nk+2. Since route
s -> n1 -> n2 -> … -> nk -> nk+1 .-> … -> d is an optimal path the s -> n1 -> n2 -> … -> nk
-> nk+1’ .-> … -> d is also an optimal path because it has a lower cost.
This implies that in an optimal route, the (k)th intermediate node selects it (k+1)th as the
MPR.
Based on I and II, all the intermediate nodes of an optimal path are MPRs of the previous
node.
Theorem 3: For all pairs of nodes s and d, if s transmits a broadcast packet P, d will
receive a copy of that packet.
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Proof: The proof follows on similar lines to [1]. Let k be the number of hops to d from
which a copy of packet P has been retransmitted. We shall prove that there exists a
minimum k=1, i.e., a one-hop neighbor of d which eventually forwards the packet.
Assume that nk (k ≥ 2) forwards the packet P to node d. Assume there exists a path nk ->
nk-1 -> nk-2 -> …-> n2 -> n1 -> d.
Based on Lemma 1, any packet received by nk-1 from nk must be relayed to nk-2. Similarly,
when nk-2 receives the packet, it forwards it to nk-3. This repeat until node n1 receives the
packet where it is automatically forwarded to node d.
7.

Simulation Results

To simulate the protocol modifications, the NS2 implementation of OEDR was extended
to reflect the changes in cost calculation. A new table was added in each node to hold the
number of packets sent on each link. The OEDR implementation in NS2 was modified by
adding definitions for the malicious nodes and providing a mechanism for authentication.
Every packet received is checked in the MAC layer, and any packet from a non-authentic
source is dropped. This means that no entries will be added in the one-hop or two hop
tables.
The simulation scenarios were based on networks of 50 and 200 nodes. The data rates
varied from 128 kbps to 4096 kbps with a packet size of 512 bytes. The nodes were
stationary in an area of 1000 x 1000 meters, their locations and flows were randomly
generated. The performance of the OLSR, OEDR and TLR was compared based on the
end-to-end delay and the energy-delay product.
Figures 5 and 6 display the average end-to-end delay for data packets on networks of 50
and 200 nodes, respectively. The delay in TLR is similar to that of OEDR. In some cases,
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however, it is less and that is due to the implicit congestion avoidance in TLR. When a
sequence of packets is sent through a path, the congestion in the intermediate nodes will
increase. Since TLR sends data through different paths, it avoids causing congestion in
the intermediate nodes, thus reducing the average delay.
The figures also show that the delay for OLSR is higher; this is because OEDR and TLR
consider the delay as a factor in choosing the routes whereas OLSR just selects the
smallest set of possible MPRs.
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Figure 5. Delay for the three routing protocols in a 50 node network.
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Figure 6. Delay for the three routing protocols in a 200 node network.
In Figures 7 and 8, the energy-delay per packet is given for networks of 50 and 200
nodes, respectively.

OLSR always has a higher energy-delay product compared to

OEDR and TLR. From the figures, we also note that OEDR performs better in terms of
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this metric. This is explained by the introduction of the packet count as a metric which
forces the nodes to select some MPR nodes that are not optimal in terms of energy
consumption and link delay.
By comparing Figure 7 with Figure 8, we find that the energy-delay metric increases as
the number of nodes increases. This is due to the higher amount of traffic flowing in the
network and the use of different paths with more intermediate hops (i.e. more energy
consumption).
E nergy per packet * D elay
0. 06

Energy * Delay (Joule-sec)

0. 05

0. 04
OLS R
0. 03

OE DR
TLR

0. 02

0. 01

0
128

256

512

1024

2048

3000

4096

Bit ra te (kbps)

Figure 7. (Energy* Delay) for the three routing protocols in a 50 node network.
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Figure 8. (Energy* Delay) for the three routing protocols in a 200 node network.
To demonstrate the effect of changing the weights in (5) on the delay and the (Energy *
Delay), we simulated the same network of 50 nodes running the TLR protocol for three
cases ({w1,w2} = {1.0, 0.0},{0.5,0.5},{0.25,0.75}). From Figure 9, when w1 decreases
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from 1.0 to 0.5 we notice that the delay decreases, this is because of the inherent
congestion avoidance as we mentioned earlier. However, when w1 decreases from 0.5 to
0.25 the effect of that is an increase in the delay because the paths being selected are not
necessarily the optimal paths in terms of delay, rather they are mostly selected based on
the number of packet flowing through each MPR.
Figure 10 shows that the energy times delay factor will increase as the values of w1
decreases. This is because the MPRs will be selected mainly based on the number of
packets going through them.
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Figure 9. Delay for the TLR with variable weights in a 50 node network.
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Figure 10. (Energy* Delay) for the TLR with variable weights in a 50 node network.
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8.

Conclusions and Future Directions

With the rapid deployment of wireless networks, security of the routing protocols is
essential for reliable operation. The threats presented in this paper indicate that more
work is needed to guarantee the privacy and integrity of the data. This is especially
important in military and safety critical environments.
TLR, an extension of the OEDR protocol, resulted in better management of route
selection for security purposes. The simulation results indicate that TLR delivered the
packets with a noticeable decrease in the average end-to-end delay. This, however,
increased the power consumed when longer routes were selected.
The addition of the authentication model in NS2 demonstrated how the TLR protocol
dropped non-authentic control packets. Nevertheless, more work needs to be done to
improve the model to enable the analysis of the computational overhead involved in
computing the hash fields as well as the bandwidth utilized for the additional bytes
inserted into the control packet in the form of the hash code.
Another modification to be investigated is the weight calculation given in (5). A dynamic
model that allows assigning different weights to each factor would be more suitable in
cases where, for example, delay is given higher priority than energy consumption.
9.
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ABSTRACT
The nodes in a wireless network are responsible for both sending their traffic as well
as relaying the traffic of other nodes in the network. This form of collaboration
between the nodes is essential for the proper delivery of data. Without fair
participation of all nodes in the routing process, some nodes may lose their energy
reserves at a high rate compared to other nodes in the network.

However,

bandwidth and energy are not the only issues in wireless networks; survivability
and reliability are critical as well. Our focus in this work is on two link state routing
protocols; OLSR and TLR. We study the effect of using these protocols on the
survivability and the reliability of wireless networks.

Both analytical and

simulation work show that TLR results in better performance due to the inherent
energy aware approach and the traffic partition used to reduce congestions in the
network.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network Architecture and Design –
wireless communication; C.2.2 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols – routing protocols.
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General Terms
Performance, Reliability, Security.
Keywords
Reliability, Survivability, Energy, Delay, Wireless Networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
In mobile ad-hoc networks, a set of nodes collaborate with each other to guarantee proper
communication between any pair of nodes in the network.

This is done with no

centralized entities to monitor the operation. Due to the dynamic topology, the links in
the network are established and broken continuously depending on the velocity, direction
and transmission range of the nodes. Unlike wired networks, the nodes in an ad hoc
network have no fixed infrastructure and are limited in communication range.
Intermediate nodes need to forward the packets in the case where the destination node is
not within the transmission range of the source.
Efficient routing in ad hoc networks is needed to properly deliver the packets to their
intended destinations with minimal delay and to extend the operational lifetime of the
network through energy efficient selection of the routes.
Many energy aware routing algorithms were proposed with the aim of improving the
survivability of the network by routing packets from their sources to the destinations with
the minimal amount of energy. The Minimum Battery Cost Routing (MBCR) is presented
in [8]. This algorithm selects the routes with the maximum total capacity. As the name
implies, the routes with the least battery cost among all candidate routes are selected.
Another algorithm is Simple Energy Aware Dynamic Source Routing (SEADSR) [3].
This is an extension of DSR in which a node, upon receiving the RREQ, incorporates a
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delay that is proportional to its energy level. This is done because DSR, by design, does
not use cost functions in route selection. The authors in [5] present the Optimal EnergyDelay Routing protocol (OEDR), an algorithm based on finding a tradeoff between delay
and energy consumption in LSR and compare that to OLSR. Paths are selected based on
the least incurred delay and energy consumed. The Power Aware Multi-Access with
Signaling (PAMAS) [6] is a protocol that efficiently uses energy by powering off nodes
that are not sending or receiving packets. In [1], a detailed analysis of the network
behavior both in steady and transient states is given. When the routing nodes move out of
the range, then the packets in transit will either be dropped or delayed and this affects the
performance of the network. Another analysis that is given in [9] studies the effect of
mobility on the availability of the paths. Both [1] and [9] use a the Continuous Time
Markov Model (CTMC) to model the connection availability for a two hop ad hoc
network with respect to node mobility and failures.
In [7], we proposed a Link State Routing protocol based on the Optimized Link State
Routing (OLSR) [4]. Our proposed protocol, the Trust Levels Routing protocol (TLR),
adds security measures to counter the vulnerabilities in OLSR and to better consume the
energy resources of the nodes in the network. In this work, we will analyze both OLSR
and TLR in terms of survivability and reliability to emphasize the improved performance
of the network in terms of lifetime and proper delivery of data. Our focus is to explain
analytically the achieved improvements in the energy consumption and its effect on the
survivability and reliability. The analysis is further supported by simulation scenarios.
The paper is organized as follows, in Section 2 we present an overview of OLSR and
TLR. Sections 3 gives a discussion of the survivability analysis of TLR followed by the
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reliability analysis in Section 4. Simulation results are given in Section 5 and the paper is
concluded in Section 6.

2. OVERVIEW OF OLSR AND TLR
The routing protocol should focus on energy conservation to increase the lifetime of the
nodes while choosing routes with the least delay, jitter and congestion. Occasionally, the
best routes for several sources, in terms of delay, go through the same node whose energy
gets consumed at a higher rate compared to other nodes. This, eventually, leads to a
premature loss of the battery of the node. A more efficient approach is to route packets
through paths that may have higher delays but with more energy resources in order to
extend the lifetime of the network.
OLSR and TLR are proactive link state routing protocols. Their operation is table driven
through periodically exchanging topology information with other nodes in the network.
The cornerstone in the operation of both protocols is the use of Multi Point Relay nodes
which limit the flooding in the network to a specific set of nodes that are chosen
according to the dynamics of the network. In OLSR, the algorithm searches for the
smallest set of MPR nodes, i.e. it selects the nodes that cover the most two hop neighbors.
As for TLR, the MPR set is selected based on a tradeoff between the delay incurred,
energy consumed and load balancing as will be explained later. In addition to energy
conservation, TLR provides guarantees of the integrity, timeliness and authenticity of the
packets.

Our proposed protocol uses the following metrics when considering the

selection of the MPR nodes.
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Energy consumed per packet: For this metric, the best path is selected based on the least
consumed total energy. Any packet going from source n1 to destination nk through some
intermediate nodes will consume
k -1

E t =  (e t (i, i +1) + e r (i, i +1) )

(1)

i 1

where Et is the total energy consumed and et(i,

i+1)

is the energy consumed to send the

packet from ni to ni+1 and er(i, i+1) is the energy consumed by ni+1 when receiving a packet
from ni .
Delay per packet: Similar to the energy metric, the goal is to find the path with the least
total delay. For a packet going from node n1 to node nk through some intermediate nodes,
the total delay incurred is given by

Dt =

k -1



i 1

d (i, i + 1)

(2)

where Dt is the total delay and d(i, i+1) is the time that starts when a packet enters the queue
of node ni until it reaches the queue of ni+1. Note that a trade off between the two metrics
exists.
Residual energy levels: This metric is used to guarantee that all nodes will have
approximately equal rates of consumption by using the nodes with the highest energy
levels. That is, the lower the remaining available energy in a node, the higher the cost of
routing through it. The cost in this case can be taken as the reciprocal of the residual
energy.
Traffic partition: This metric serves multiple purposes. First, less congestion and delay
will be incurred through the intermediate nodes. Second, a higher throughput will be
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achieved because data packets are going through different paths. More importantly, the
traffic will be fragmented into multiple paths which can potentially reduce the ability of a
malicious node to capture the whole stream of traffic.
Since TLR bases the selection of MPRs on a composite metric that differs from that of
OLSR, the MPR set chosen does not necessarily have to be identical for the same
network topology and conditions. Moreover, if the nodes are stationary, the MPR set for
nodes running OLSR will always be the same until one or more nodes lose their battery
power. In TLR, the MPR set is dynamically changed more frequently based on the MPR
routing criteria.
TLR is enforced with security mechanisms to overcome some of the security threats that
may impede the operation of the network. The control packets are signed and the data
stream is encrypted with using a lightweight encryption algorithm.
2.1

MPR Selection Algorithm

The following notation will be used
N: set of nodes in network
s: source node
d: destination node
N1(s): One-hop neighbors of node s
N2(s): Two-hop neighbors of node s
MPR(s): The set of nodes selected as MPRs by node s (MPR(s)  N1(s) )
Px,y: Number of packets sent from x through MPR y.
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Cx,y : cost of link between nodes x and y, where
Cx,y  w1 * (Energyxy * Delayxy )  w2 * Px,y

(3)

Initially the MPR set MPR(s) is empty.
1. First, find all the nodes in N2(s) that have a single neighbor in N1(s). Add these nodes
of N1(s) to the MPR set if they are not already in MPR(s). (Because there are no other
MPR candidates).
2. While there exists a node in N2(s) for which MPR node is not selected, do:
a. TLR: for each node in N2(s), with multiple neighbors from N1(s), select a
neighbor from N1(s) as multipoint relay node which results in minimum cost
from s to the node in N2(s), CMPR according to (3), and add it to the MPR set if
is not already in MPR(s)
b. OLSR: for each node in N2(s), with multiple neighbors from N1(s), select a
neighbor from N1(s) as multipoint relay node which covers that maximum
number of two hop neighbors in N2(s) and add it to the MPR set if is not
already in MPR(s)

3. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS OF TLR
The survivability of the network is directly related to the lifetime of nodes in the network.
Clearly, the energy in every node in the network has to be properly utilized in order to
avoid premature depletion of energy of the nodes and to minimize the variance in energy
levels between them. The power consumption is due to 1) transmission of a packet; 2)
reception of a packet 3) retransmission of packets due to congestion 4) power used when
a node is idle.
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Given a network modeled as a graph G = (N,L) where N is the set of nodes and L is the
set of links (i,j)

 N. A link (i,j) exists if and only if j  N1(i). The lifetime of a node in

the network running the OLSR protocol is given as
LTi 

(1   )



kN1(i)

Ei
etx ri  k 

e

r

rx j  i
j:iN1(j)



(4)

where,
Ei Energy level of node i at t = 0 (Joule)
etx Energy consumed to transmit data (Joule/bit)
erx Energy consumed to receive data (Joule/bit)

ri   j Data rate between source i and destination j (bit/sec)
ε Energy consumed during the idle time (Joule/sec)
γ Factor representing the needed retransmissions
As for a node running TLR, the lifetime is
LTi 

(   )



Ei
etx ri k 

kN1(i)

e

r

rx j i
j:iN1(j)

  

(5)

with
μ Energy used for overhead operations in TLR (encryption functionality).
The total energy used for transmission of packets and the total energy to compensate for
repeated packets due to congestion are multiplied by factors α and β, respectively. This
is a result of the load balancing in TLR which results in a node being used less frequently
compared to the case of OLSR. Moreover, load balancing results in less congestion
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leading to fewer dropped packets. Note that the factors α and β are inversely proportional
to the number of available MPR candidates.
TLR outperforms OLSR in terms of energy conservation by distributing the load on
various intermediate nodes. This leads to a relatively smaller variance in the battery
levels and longer lifetime for the whole network.
To illustrate, consider the network given in Figure 1 where nodes S1 and S2 send traffic
through nodes A, B and C to the destinations D1 and D2, respectively. Assuming that
each of nodes S1 and S2 has 50 packets to send and also assume that each of nodes A, B
and C has sufficient energy to receive and forward 100 packets only. With OLSR, the
node that covers the maximum number of hops will be selected as the MPR. In this case,
node C will be selected because it covers 2 nodes (D1 and D2) whereas nodes A and B
only cover D1 and D2, respectively. Thus, both nodes S1 and S2 will send all their traffic
through C which will result in consuming all it energy resources after sending 50 each
(100 in total). After that, S1 will select A as the MPR whereas S2 will select B. In this
scenario, node C lost all its energy prematurely whereas nodes A and B still maintained
their initial energy reserves. If either node A or B moves out range then network will be
partitioned due to the lack of available paths.
On the other hand, when TLR is used with the same network topology using the initial
link costs given in Figure 1, node C will be initially selected as the MPR because it has
the least cost for both S1 and S2. After forwarding 20 packets, the link cost for S1-C and
S2-C will be 3.5. Thus, on the next topology update, S1 will switch to node A for
forwarding whereas S2 will maintain the same link S2-C. After transmitting 20 more
packets, the updated link costs will be (S1-A = 4.33, S1-C = 2.86, S2-C =3.86, S2-B =
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3.75. As a result, node S1 will use the link S1-C and node S2 will use S2-B. Table 1
details the energy levels of the nodes throughout the above mentioned scenario. Note that
node C still retains 40% of its energy whereas it consumed all its energy when OLSR was
used.

Figure 1. Ad hoc network with seven nodes.
Table 1. Remaining energy levels of the three routing nodes using TLR.
Link Costs

Active Link

Remaining Energy

# Packets Sent
S1-A S1-C S2-C S2-B

S1

S2

A

B

C

0

3.0

2.0

2.0

3.75

S1-C S2-C 100% 100% 100%

20

3.0

3.5

3.5

3.75

S1-A S2-C 100% 100%

80%

40

4.33

2.86

3.86

3.75

S1-C S2-B

90%

100%

70%

60

3.33

4.333

3.33

5.17

S1-A S2-C

90%

90%

60%

80

4.75

4.0

5.0

4.17

S1-C S2-B

80%

90%

50%

100

3.75

6.0

5.0

5.69

S1-A S2-C

80%

80%

40%

4. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF TLR
The reliability of a system is defined as the conditional probability that the system is
operational at time t given that it was operational at time t0. Similarly, the reliability of a
routing protocol can be given as the conditional probability that the network will properly

42
deliver the packets from the source to the destination given that the routing paths were
available at time t0.
Considering that a network is a system consisting of nodes and links then the reliability
of the network will be directly dependent on the reliability of the components. Any
failure to either of the nodes or links may lead to disruption of the service of the network.
The service may remain available due to the redundancy of paths through various nodes.
In this section, we analyze the reliability of OLSR and TLR for stationary nodes using
Markov analysis.
4.1

Markov Analysis

Markov analysis provides a way of studying the sequence of events that a system may
execute. This sequence of random and related events is useful in determining the
reliability and availability of the system since it reflects the transition probabilities
between the system states.
A Markov model is a function of two random variables; the time of observation and the
current state, irrespective of the previous sequence that led to the current state.
The main advantages using Markov analysis are the simplicity of constructing the model,
availability of transition probabilities between states and the incorporation of component
redundancy. However, one drawback of this form of analysis is that the complexity
increases with the number of states.
A Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) can be used to model a system with a finite
number of states to obtain a closed form solution of the reliability or availability of the
system. For simplicity, we will assume that 1) component failures are mutually
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independent; 2) failures occur at an exponential rate; 3) equal repair rate for all
component failures and 4) only one failure can occur during transition between states.
The last condition is to guarantee that no two routers fail during a switching delay period.
Consider the Markov reliability model given in Figure 3. The probability of transition
from state S0 to S1 in time t is equal to λ0t and the probability of remaining the same
state is (1- λ0)t. We can find the probabilities of the system being in either of the states
at time t = t+ t using the difference equations.
PS0 (t  t )  (1  0 t )PS0 (t )

(6)

PS1 (t  t )  (0 t )PS0 (t )  (1  1t )PS1 (t )

(7)

PS2 (t  t )  (1t ) PS1 (t )  (1  2 t )PS2 (t )

(8)

PS3 (t  t )  (2 t )PS2 (t )  PS3 (t )

(9)

Rearranging the equations:
PS 0 (t  t )  PS 0 (t )
 -  0 PS0 (t )
t

(10)

PS1 (t  t )  PS1 (t )
  0 PS 0 (t )  1 PS 1 (t )
t

(11)

PS2 (t  t )  PS2 (t )
 1 PS 1 (t )   2 PS 2 (t )
t

(12)

PS3 (t   t )  PS3 (t )
  2 PS 2 ( t )
t

(13)

When t  0
dPS 3 (t )
dt

  2 PS 2 (t )

dPS 2 (t )
 1 PS 1 (t )  2 PS 2 (t )
dt

(14)

(15)
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dPS 1 (t )
 0 PS 0 (t )  1 PS 1 (t )
dt

(16)

dPS 0 (t )
 0 PS 0 (t )
dt

(17)

The set of differential equations (14)-(17) can be solved to find the overall reliability as
will be shown in Section 4.2.
The analysis will use the CTMC to find the reliability of a network consisting of
stationary nodes with no repair of dead nodes.
4.2

Reliability Analysis

The reliability of any ad hoc network depends on the reliability of the nodes. Thus, the
failure of the network will be proportional to the expected lifetime of the nodes in the
network. The network reliability and survivability calculation, however, is not simple; at
some point, given the topology and the number/location of failed nodes, a network will
fail.

This will be case/state specific.

However, we can make the following

generalizations. The failure rate, λ, is defined as the number of failures per unit of time.
One of the advantages of TLR is that it increases the average lifetime of all the nodes and
decreases the variance of energy levels between the nodes compared to OLSR. In effect,
TLR decreases the failure rate of the nodes which results in higher reliability.
By design, OLSR runs the nodes in a standby mode where only one node is responsible
of routing and all other nodes remain in idle mode. When the routing node dies, another
node will be selected to perform the routing. On the other hand, TLR runs the nodes in a
parallel mode where one node handles the routing functionality for some time then
another node takes over. The routing nodes in such a scenario will have a longer lifetime
as was shown in (5).
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Consider the network given in Figure 2, in which S1 has no direct access to its two hop
neighbor D1. Instead, nodes A, B and C will be used to route the traffic.
For OLSR, the Markov Reliability Model is given in Figure 3. The system may be in one
of the four states {Si | i = 0,1,2,3}. State S0 represents the initial state of the network at
time t = 0 and all three nodes will be functional whereas S3 is the state when all three
routing nodes fail.

Figure 2. Ad hoc network with five nodes.

Figure 3. Markov Reliability Model for the network running OLSR.

The probabilities of each of the states can be calculated using equations. (14) –(17) with
the initial conditions PS0(0) = 1, PS1(0) = PS2(0) = PS3(0) = 0. Taking the Laplace
transform of the above equations yields
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sPS 3 ( s )   2 PS 2 ( s )

(18)

sPS 2 ( s )  1 PS 1 ( s )   2 PS 2 ( s )

(19)

sPS1 ( s)  0 PS 0 ( s)  1 PS1 ( s)

(20)

sPS 0 ( s )  1  0 PS 0 ( s )

(21)

Rearranging the equations
PS 0 ( s ) 

1
s  0

(22)

PS 1 ( s ) 

0
( s  0 )( s  1 )

(23)

PS 1 ( s) 

0 1
( s  0 )( s  1 )( s  2 )

(24)

Converting back to the time domain
PS 0 (t )  e  0t
PS 1 ( t ) 

(25)



0
e   0 t  e  1 t
( 1   0 )





e0 t
e1t
e 2 t


PS 2 (t)  01 

(1  0 )(2  0 ) (0  1 )(2  1 ) (0  2 )(1  2 ) 

(26)

(27)

If 0 1 2  then we can find PS1(t) and PS2(t) using L’Hospital’s rule (ordinary
substitution would not work because the equations would yield 0/0).
PS 0 (t )  e

 t

PS 1 (t )  te
PS 2 (t ) 

 t

( t ) 2   t
e
2

(28)
(29)
(30)
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The network will remain operational as long as it remains in S0, S1, or S2. Thus, the
reliability of the network will be
 t

R(t)  PS 0 (t)  PS1(t)  PS 2 (t)  e

 t

 te



(t )2 t
e
2

(31)

An interesting observation is that the terms in R(t) are the first three terms in the Poisson
distribution. It can be read as the probability of zero failures in time t plus the probability
of one failure in time t plus the probability of 2 failures in time t. Extending the model to
n nodes would result in
R (t ) 

n 1


i0

(t ) i t
e
i!

(32)

Figure 4 shows the Markov Reliability Model for the TLR protocol. Here, the transition
probability from state S0 to S1 is 3λt because all three nodes are functional and anyone
of them could fail. The same logic can be applied to the other transitions in the figure.

Figure 4. Markov Reliability Model for the network running TLR.
The reliability can be either calculated in a similar manner to that done for OLSR or we
can use the fact that all the components are working in parallel and the system will be
functional if either one of them is working.
R(t) P(A B  C)  3e t  3e 2t  e 3t
The reliability of a network with n routing nodes can be give as

(33)
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R(t) 

n

n

n

 P(A ) -   P(A A )
i

i 1
n



n

i

i 1 ji 1

n

  P(A A A

i 1 j  i 1k  j 1

i

j

k

j

) 

(34)

 (-1) n -1 [P(A1 A 2  A n )]
Looking back at (5), we see the lifetime of a node will increase as the factors α and β
decrease. Evidently, with more MPR candidate these factors must decrease since the node
will be forwarding or retransmitting fewer packets. When only one MPR is available then

α and β will be equal to 1.0 as the packets must follow the same path.
The relation between the failure rates for nodes running TLR (λTLR) and that of OLSR
(λOLSR)is

(   )  etx ri k  erx rj i     
kN1(i)
j:iN1(j)

TLR  
 (1   )  etx ri k  erx rj i    OLSR


kN1(i)
j:iN1(j)

(35)

To illustrate, assume that the failure rate of nodes resulting from running the OLSR and
TLR protocol are

OLSR =0.05 and TLR =0.025, respectively. The reliability functions of

the network for both protocols are given in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Reliability curves for OLSR and TLR.
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If the parameters of the network such as the congestion and data rates are known then we
can determine the encryption algorithm to be used based on the value of , according to
the following condition

  ((1   )   (1   ))

e

kN1(i)

r

tx i   k

(36)

5. SIMULATION RESULTS
We used the network simulator NS2 to study the effect of TLR on the survivability of the
nodes in the network. We implemented the algorithm as an extension to the existing
OLSR code by modifying the selection of the MPR nodes in NS2. The energy values for
transmission were increased to simulate the extra energy needed for encryption. The
simulations are conducted in a 670 x 670 area with 100 nodes. The nodes communicate
using Constant Bit Rate (CBR) sources that are connected to the nodes in a random
fashion. The data rates of 64, 128, 256 and 512 kbps were used and the results of the runs
were averaged. Each run had a period of 100 seconds.
The first objective of the simulation was to show the distribution of the energy in the
nodes after running for the whole simulation period. After each run, the remaining energy
of each node was sorted into one of 10 categories based on the percentage of the
remaining energy compared to the energy level at the beginning of the simulation.
We note from Figure 6 that the percentage of remaining energy in the nodes running
OLSR is not distributed optimally throughout the network. On one hand, we notice that a
high percentage of the nodes hold a high percentages of their initial energy which means
they were not actively involved in the routing process. This might seem to be a positive
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feature but it comes at a cost. Namely, another high percentage of nodes have little
remaining energy remaining. Only a few nodes have moderate consumption of their
energy during the simulation.

Figure 6. Energy distribution in nodes running OLSR.
This distribution is not desirable because it shows that around 46% of the nodes had
energy levels of 30% or less.
A more desirable distribution of energy is shown in Figure 7. In this figure it is evident
that a very small percentage of nodes have 30% of less of their initial energy. Also, the
percentage of nodes with the higher energy reserves, 80% and above, is smaller than what
was shown in the case of OLSR. Most of the energy is distributed among the nodes
equally which leads to an extended lifetime of the nodes in the network.

Figure 7. Energy distribution in nodes running TLR.
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The second objective of the simulation was to study the average energy reserves of all the
nodes in the network throughout the period of the simulation. This was done by using the
energy levels given in the trace files of NS2. The sampling of the energy was done in 10
second intervals.
From Figure 8, it is evident that TLR leads to a higher average percentage of remaining
energy. This is attributed to the decrease in dropped packets in the network. We see that
TLR will give a longer lifetime of the network.

Figure 8. Percentage of remaining energy for networks running OLSR and TLR.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Two link state routing protocols were compared in terms of survivability and reliability.
Markov models were used to find the reliability function and it was shown how the
reliability of TLR is higher than that of OLSR. The results of this work show the
advantage of using TLR instead of OLSR. Notably, TLR results in an extended lifetime
of the nodes which may translate to a higher availability of paths. Future extension of this
work includes the analysis of the routing protocols in the case of mobility. In such a case,
the intermediate node may move in and out of the communication range.
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Abstract
The routing of packets in ad hoc networks is based on the assumption that all
neighbors are trustworthy and willing to cooperate with other nodes. This inherent
trust, however, can lead to undesirable consequences in the presence of selfish or
malicious intermediate nodes that drop part of or all the packets to be routed
through them. In this paper, we highlight this vulnerability and propose a
reputation based model, TRUST (Trusted Routing Under Security Threats), to
exclude non-cooperative nodes from the routing tables. TRUST is a statistical model
based on the Beta probability distribution function (PDF). Each node monitors the
activity of its neighbors and calculates a value based on the ratio of forwarded
packets to the sent packets. This information is shared by all the nodes in the
network to infer the trust levels by calculating the expected value of the PDF using
the method of moment matching. As an example, we apply TRUST to OLSR and
OEDR. Through simulation, we show that it improves the packet delivery rate and
reduces the end-to-end delay and the number of dropped packets.

Keywords—Reputation, Trust, Energy, Delay.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless ad hoc networks are formed by a set of nodes that collaborate together to
achieve proper delivery of data packets. Every node depends on its neighbors to forward
its packets to the destination. At the same time, the node must relay packets not intended
to it to their destination. Proper routing depends on the assumption that all the nodes are
cooperative and willing to relay the packets. In reality, this can not be guaranteed and
successful communication in the network can be put at risk in the presence of selfish or
malicious nodes that do not perform the forwarding operation.
A selfish node may not forward packets due to its limited power reserves whereas a
malicious node misleads its victims to route their traffic through it and later drops all or
part of the packet stream. Current MANET routing protocols do not have a mechanism to
detect this threat of denial of service. We propose a reputation based model that
encourages cooperation between nodes and isolates misbehaving nodes based on the
percentage of their successful forwarding and their reputation amongst other nodes in the
network.
Generally speaking, reputation models are used to improve cooperation between
entities by implicitly forcing them to work together. This is done through giving
incentives in the form of higher rating for cooperation and penalties of lower rating for
disobliging entities. Any entity that does not cooperate will risk getting a lower reputation
and thus losing the asset of its reputation. In this work, we study how nodes adhere to the
condition of forwarding packets from sources other than themselves and how to translate
such cooperation into a numerical value representing the trust value.
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Various reputation based models for packet forwarding have been proposed. In [1],
Baras and Mehta suggested an algorithm based on swarm intelligence for discovering and
maintaining paths in MANET. CORE [2] and CONFIDANT [3] are reputation based
models that monitor the packet loss in the neighborhood by running the nodes in a
promiscuous mode to determine the ratio of forwarded packets to the total packets
received. SAFE [4] is another system that monitors the neighborhood. However, unlike
CONFIDANT and CORE, SAFE relies on monitoring the sequence numbers of packets
for its calculations. Marti et al. [5] proposed the use of Watchdog and Pathrater to
determine the routing path based on the knowledge of misbehaving nodes and link
reliability. Buchegger and Le Boudec [6] and Ganeriwal and Srivastava [7] proposed
reputation systems that are based on using the Beta distribution as the conjugate prior for
Bayesian analysis to update the trust values based on the observations. Both references
have similar concepts except that the former deals with ad hoc networks while the latter
is concerned with sensor network. Jøsang and Ismail [8] proposed the Beta reputation
system for centralized environments. Their work, which can be extended to noncentralized environments, discusses methods for merging, discounting and forgetting the
estimated opinions.
In this work, we propose a statistical reputation model that uses the watchdog
mechanism to observe the cooperation of the neighboring nodes. Similar to [6], [7], and
[8], our model uses the Beta distribution as a basis for calculating/updating the trust
value. However, it differs in that it does not use Bayesian analysis. Instead, it uses self
observed values along with the observations of all other nodes to estimate the parameters
of the PDF using the method of moment matching.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the reputation
based model and the parameter estimation. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the
operation of OLSR and OEDR and discusses the algorithm used for updating reputation
values. In Section 4, we present the simulation results followed by the conclusions in
Section 5.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Beta Distribution Function
The Beta distribution is a continuous PDF defined on the interval [0,1] as
f ( x;  ,  ) 

(   )  1
x (1  x)  1
( )(  )

(1)

where α > 0, β > 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 with the constraint that x ≠ 0 if α < 1 and x ≠1 if β< 1.
The parameters α and β are called the shape parameters and Γ(.) is the Gamma function
defined as


( y )   t y 1e t dt

(2)

0

This can be integrated by parts to yield
( y )  ( y  1)( y  1)

(3)

A special case of the Beta distribution occurs when α=β=1. In this case the PDF will
represent the Uniform distribution.
The moments of the Beta distribution are calculated according to
(  j  1)
j 1 (    j  1)
i

i  

(4)
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Thus,
E[ X ]  1 




E[ X 2 ]   2 

 (  1)
(   )(    1)

(5)

(6)

From (5) and (6), the variance is calculated as
Var[ X ]  E[ X 2 ]  ( E[ X ]) 2 

2
(   ) (    1)

(7)

Figure 1 shows the effect of the changes in the shape factors. As α and β increase, the
peak of the curve becomes higher and the width of the curve decreases indicating more
confidence in the accumulated observations.
The Beta distribution provides much flexibility in the case of trust. This is a result of it
being bounded in the interval [0,1] which can be considered as a range of no trust to full
trust. It also gives a level of confidence in the reported value. For example, in the curves
we observe that the mean for the PDFs for α = β is equal to 0.5 according to (5), however
the variance decreases from 1/12 (when α = β = 1) to 1/68 (when α = β =8). In such a
case, although both curves give the same expected value, we get more confidence in the
latter due to low variance. This coincides with the belief that a larger sample should give
a more accurate result.
If we consider the Beta distribution, represented by its shape parameters, as the
reputation of a node, then we can quantify that reputation by taking the expected value in
(5) as the trust value.
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Figure 1. Different shapes of the Beta distribution function

B. Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian analysis is used in [6] and [7] for forming opinions about the reputation of
other nodes. Basically, the goal is to estimate the probability that a node will not act
maliciously. Baye’s theorem is given as
P( Belief | Observation) 

P(Observation | Belief ) P( Belief )
Normalization

(8)

where P(Belief | Observation) is the posterior probability which reflects the updating
probability of the belief given the added observations. P(Observation | Belief) represents
the new observations and P(Belief) represents the prior belief.
One interesting property of the Beta distribution is that it is a conjugate prior for the
Binomial distribution. This means that if the prior is a beta distribution and the latest
observations are binomially distributed then the posterior will be a beta distribution.
Transactions with only two results, such as satisfaction and dissatisfaction, can be
considered binomially distributed.
The shape parameters α and β represent the satisfaction and dissatisfaction about
transactions between two entities, respectively. Initially, with no prior experience, α=β=1
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which represents the Uniform distribution. If a node has s + f transactions of which s are
successful and f are failures then the new posterior is given as [7]
P( x) 

Bin(s  f , s) * Beta(1,1)
 Beta(s  1, f  1)
Normalization

(9)

The use of Bayesian analysis results in a flexible scheme for updating the reputation
value by continuously modifying the shape parameters according to

    s

(10)

    f

(11)

And

where  is the aging factor used for giving higher weight to recent values
C. Parameter Estimation Using Moment Matching
In Section 2.1, it was demonstrated how the curve changed according to the changes in
the shape factors which indirectly represent the trust value to be assigned. By
continuously incrementing α and β with each successful or failed transaction, the curves
will tend to have higher peaks and lower standard deviations.
In normal circumstances, a cooperative node in a network should uphold its reputation
unless it gets compromised. The same can be said regarding malicious nodes whose
uncooperative nature would be detected through its high failed transactions. Thus, it is
safe to say that after a relatively long period of network activity, malicious nodes will
have high β values and cooperative nodes will have high α values which translate to low
trust and high trust, respectively.
When a trusted node with a high α value gets compromised, its ratings will start to
decline due to the aging factor in (10) and the β value will increase because of detected
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failed transmissions. However, the reputation updates will take a long time to reach
correct values that correctly represent the status of the compromised node depending on
the value of λ. This means that a compromised node will not be detected for a relatively
long period of time.
A solution for fast convergence is to use self-observations along with the updates of
other nodes in the network to back the observations. This will result in higher confidence
as the sample becomes larger. One method is to use all the reported trust values to
estimate the shape parameters of the PDF that would represent the overall trust value. In
other words, instead of having the shape parameters and trying to find the probability
within [0,1], we will have a set of samples (reported trust values from others) and try to
find the best values of α and β that represent the curve.
Moment matching is a popular method in statistics used for parameter estimation in
large samples. It usually results in a small loss of precision. The main idea of moment
matching is to calculate a number of moments equal to the number of parameters to be
estimated. In the case of the Beta distribution, we have two shape parameters to estimate,
and for that we will calculate the first two central moments.
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Thus, by equating the calculated values to those given in (5) and (7)
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where  and  are the estimated shape parameters. With some algebra we get
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By using (16) and (17), we can determine the estimated shape parameters for the
overall sample which can be used for calculating a numerical trust value based on (5).
III. TRUSTED ROUTING UNDER SECURITY THREATS (TRUST)
We show in this section an example of how the proposed reputation system can be
applied to MANET routing protocols. The protocols selected are Optimal Link State
Routing (OLSR) [9] and Optimal Energy Delay Routing (OEDR) [10] due to the fact that
they both involve making critical decisions about which nodes to select for forwarding
their traffic as will be explained shortly. It should be emphasized that this system is not
solely applicable to the chosen protocols and that it can be applied to other existing
protocols.
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A. Overview of OLSR and OEDR
OLSR and OEDR are table driven protocols with each node maintaining multiple tables
for proper routing. Each node holds information about the immediate neighbors, two-hop
neighbors, topology and routes. The cornerstone of their operation is the concept of
Multi-Point Relay (MPR) nodes. In brief, an MPR is a node that has a bidirectional link
with its selector and is responsible of forwarding control packets from and data packets to
that selector. The use of MPR nodes results in reducing the packets flooded in the
network since broadcast packets will be forwarded through them only.
In [10], it is suggested that all the intermediate nodes on a path must be selected as
MPRs by the preceding node on the path. This highlights the importance of choosing
dependable MPRs to properly deliver the packets from the source to the destination. The
role of TRUST in this example will be to enhance the selection of MPRs such that nodes
with higher trust values are chosen.
In the case of OLSR, each node selects its MPR nodes from its one hop neighbors
based on the maximum coverage of two hop neighbors. On the other hand, OEDR uses
the energy-delay product and the remaining energy levels as factors in determining its
MPRs. This essential information is usually communicated through control packets.
There are two types of control packets; HELLO and Topology Control (TC) packets. A
node sends HELLO packets to its immediate neighbors informing them about its presence
in their vicinity and detailing its neighbors. If a recipient detects its ID in the list of
neighbors of the source then a bidirectional link does exist and the node becomes an
MPR candidate. HELLO packets in OEDR serve an additional purpose of passing
information about the energy and delay requirements in the neighborhood.
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TC packets, on the other hand, detail the current information that a node possesses
regarding the network topology. A TC packet is flooded in the network through MPR
nodes only, and each node that receives it uses the information along with its own view
of the network to update its network topology tables.
The routes are determined according to the information in the immediate neighbors and
topology tables. Routing tables are calculated and updated whenever a change in the
network topology is detected. OLSR protocol uses a shortest path algorithm while OEDR
employs a minimum cost spanning tree in constructing the routes between a source and
destination pair.
In the next sub-section, we discuss the vulnerabilities in these protocols and show why
a reputation model is needed to ensure proper routing of data in the network.
B. Vulnerabilities in OLSR and OEDR
Due to the inherent trust in these protocols, they become vulnerable to malicious/selfish
activity. When a node selects its MPRs, it assumes that the neighbor will forward the
packet in a best effort to its intended destination without any modifications in the
contents of the packet. This assumption, unfortunately, is not always valid. Attackers can
exploit this exposure to disrupt the operation of network. Following are two examples of
attacks.
Modification Attack: An intruder can change the header or payload of the packet. In the
former, it either alters the destination address, source address, time-to-live, or the
sequence number to match a previously used number. Thus, the packet will either be
dropped prematurely or be delivered to a wrong destination.
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This kind of attack can be avoided using Message Authentication Codes to guarantee
that it was not changed in transit. Another approach is for the source to overhear its next
hops transmission and compare the forwarded packet with the one that it has actually
sent. If an anomaly is detected, it feeds that information to the reputation system and
lowers its level of trust for that node.
Packet Dropping: This happens in various scenarios. 1) a given node with limited
power reserves may choose not to forward the traffic it receives from its MPR selectors
to conserve its energy. 2) a given malicious node broadcasts false TC information to
convince others that it is a suitable MPR. Once it’s selected as an MPR, it starts dropping
packets instead of forwarding them.
It’s worth mentioning that a node does not necessarily drop all the packets routed
through it. It may selectively drop packets from a node while forwarding packets from
others.

Both vulnerabilities mentioned above highlight the importance of having a

mechanism to rate the level of cooperation of MPR nodes. Timestamps and
authentication can be used to overcome the modification problem but the packet dropping
vulnerability needs to be addressed using a reputation system to guarantee that selected
MPRs are, indeed, forwarding packets for their selectors.
IV. TRUST CORE
TRUST is based on running the nodes in promiscuous mode to capture all the packets
transmitted by immediate neighbors. The idea is that whenever a node sends a packet, it
keeps a copy of it in a repository for future comparison. Since the node shares a
bidirectional link with the MPR, it can monitor the next hop to determine whether the
packet was forwarded or not.
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To illustrate how the model works, suppose that node 0 in Figure 2 uses node 1 as its
MPR to deliver a broadcast packet. Node 0 keeps a copy in a list of previously sent
packets and increments the number of packets sent to node 1. Within a specified interval,
node 0 monitors the transmissions of node 1 to detect whether the packet was forwarded.
If the packet is detected and the content has not been changed then node 0 increments the
number of packets forwarded by node 1. If, on the other hand, the contents were changed
or the timer reached zero without detecting a forwarded copy then the number of failed
forwards for node 1 is incremented.

Figure 2. Ad hoc network with six nodes
The ides is further extended to cover nodes that are not part of the route. For example,
node 2 is an immediate neighbor of node 0 but it is not selected as an MPR. Thus, when it
receives the packet from node 0, it does not forward it. However, node 2 uses the
information to monitor node 1 (another immediate neighbor of 2) to verify its cooperation
with node 0. This approach gives node 1 an added incentive to cooperate rather than risk
getting lower ratings from both nodes 0 and 2 which would, later on, affect its overall
reputation in the network.
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Each node maintains two values of reputation; local and global. Both values range from
0.0 (no packets forwarded) to 1.0 (all packets were forwarded). All nodes initially assign
a reputation level of 0.5 to both local and global values, which is equivalent to Beta(1,1).
These levels change according to the observed forwarding operations in the node being
monitored. Both the local and global reputation values are used in the overall calculation
of a numeric trust value.
The overall trust value is calculated by combining both the local trust and the reported
trust from other neighbors.
Ti , j   Li , j   Gi , j

(18)

where,
Ti , j : The overall trust value for node j at node i.

 , : weigh factors
Li , j : The locally observed trust value for node j at node i.
Gi , j : The globally reported trust value for node j at node i.

A. Monitoring Cooperation
A local reputation value reflects the observation of node i regarding the cooperation of
its neighbor j. By referring again to Figure 2, suppose that node 1 is selected by nodes 0
and 2 to forward their traffic to nodes 4 and 5, respectively. The local reputation of node
1 at node 0, L0,1, depends on the observation of node 0 regarding its own traffic in
addition to its observation regarding the traffic generated by node 2.
Thus, the local trust value of node j at node i can be calculated as follows

Li , j  w1

Fi
F
 w2 k
Si
Sk

(19)
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where,
Fi : Number of packets forwarded by j on behalf of i
Si : Number of packets sent from node i to node j
Fk : Number of packets forwarded by j on behalf of k, (k≠i)
S k : Number of packets sent from node k to node j.
The weights 1 and 2 are assigned based on the nature of traffic going through the
monitored node. If a node just forwards the packets generated by the monitor then ( 1
=1) and ( 2 = 0). If the traffic is generated by nodes other than the monitoring node then
( 1 = 0) and ( 2 = 1). If both types of sources are available, then we assign values to 1
and 2 such that 1 + 2 = 1.
B. Reputation Algorithm Pseudo Code
For every packet received, do


If unique ID does not exist in table
(i) If the packet is destined to monitoring node


Accept and move packet to upper layers



Return

(ii) Else, packet not destined to monitoring node


If monitoring node is the MPR
i)

If next hop is the final destination


Forward the packet



Return

ii) Else, next hop is not the final destination
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Forward the packet



Increment the number of packets sent from monitoring node.



Return

Else, monitoring node is not the MPR
i)

If the MPR is a neighbor of the monitoring node with a bidirectional
link





Increment the number of packets sent from neighbor



Return

Else, unique ID exists in table
(i) If monitoring node is the original source of the message


Increment the number of packets forwarded for monitoring node.



Jump to (iii)

(ii) Else, monitoring node is not the original source


Increment the number of packets forwarded for others.

(iii) Erase the entry of the packet from the list.
(iv) Return
C. Global Reputation
In general, a node i assigns a global trust value to node j, Gi,j, by using the reported trust
values of all the nodes in the network other than j. Then it assigns weights to the reported
trust values based on its current observed reputation of each reporting node. This, in
effect, assigns lower values to the reported samples of low-trust nodes. Each reported
value from node k to node i about node j, Tk,j, will be modified according to
Ti , j  Tk , j .Ti ,k k  j

(20)
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The updated reports are then used as the sample for estimating the global reputation
value using the method of moments in (15) and (16) to get the estimated shape
^

^

parameters,  ,  and then to calculate the global trust value
^

Gi , j 


^

^

(21)

 

With the global reputation values, each node has an idea of the history of cooperation
of every other node in the network.
To support the reputation model in a changing environment, the network members need
to communicate their local trust values to all the nodes in the network. This is to inform
non-neighbors about the current observations a node has regarding its neighborhood. For
example, if node 0 determines that node 1 is not cooperative it should broadcast that
information to make the observation known to all nodes (especially non-neighbors that
may become neighbors of node 1 in the future).
To allow proper dissemination of reputation values, a third type of control packet is
added. Reputation Control (RC) packets are sent through all the nodes in the network
instead of just through the selected MPR as is currently done with TC packets. RC
packets are sent periodically to update other nodes or whenever a local value for a node
goes below a specified threshold.
We reason that the added overhead is justifiable since the main purpose of such a
flooding is, in fact, to guarantee that multiple copies of the same RC packet are received
and compared together to detect any modifications. Furthermore, forwarding RC packets
through the selected MPR only may pose a threat if the MPR drops the RC packets.
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Normally, malicious/selfish behavior must be detected by more than one neighbor
resulting in various transmissions of RC packets.
D. Overhead Analysis
The protocol control overhead results from the exchange of HELLO packets locally and
the broadcast of TC packets. According to [11], a network running with N nodes and
periodic control packets will send
hN  O p tN 2 (packets/s)

(22)

where,
h: rate of sending HELLO packets.
t: rate of sending TC packets
Op: Optimization broadcast factor ( 1/ ≤ Op ≤ 1)
: Average number of neighbors.
The optimization broadcast factor represents the usage of MPR nodes. A value of (Op =
1) means that all the nodes are broadcasting the packet whereas a value of (Op = 1/)
means that on average one MPR is used.
The ratio of control packets to the total bandwidth is given as
(hNH  O p tN 2T ) / B

(23)

where,
H: average size of HELLO packets.
T: average size of TC packets.
B: available bandwidth.
The overhead given above applies to OLSR and OEDR only. For TRUST, the overhead
is different due to the usage of RC packets which are sent out either periodically in a set
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interval to ensure proper updates of reputation in the whole network or randomly
depending on the detected changes in the reputation values.
Thus, the number of control packets sent per second in TRUST is
hN  O p tN 2  (r   ) N 2 (packets/s)

(24)

where,
r: rate of RC packets
: average number of detected anomalies.
Note that Op in the case of RC packets is equal to 1 since all the packets broadcast
through all the nodes and not just the MPRs. The ratio of control packets to the total
bandwidth is given as
(hNH  O p tN 2T  (r   ) N 2 R ) / B

(25)

V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We used the network simulator NS2 to study the effect of the reputation model on the
routing process. We implemented the algorithm as an extension to the existing OLSR and
OEDR codes by modifying the nodes in NS2 to simulate the behavior of a
malicious/selfish node. The simulations are conducted in a 670 x 670 area with 50 mobile
nodes. The nodes move in the network with a maximum speed of 20 m/s following the
random waypoint mobility model. The nodes communicate using Constant Bit Rate
(CBR) sources that are connected to the nodes in a random fashion. Each run had a
period of 100 seconds. Finally, the network has a maximum of 15 malicious nodes.

73
Our first objective was to study the effect of the number of uncooperative nodes on the
overall delivery of packets. We ran the simulation with 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 and 15 malicious
nodes that were chosen at random.
Figure 3 shows that the packet delivery ratio decreased as the number of malicious
nodes increased. This is a direct result of the excessive dropping that takes place as more
selfish/malicious nodes join the network. With 2 nodes, we observe that at least 90% of
the packets are delivered for all protocols. However, with 15 nodes, OLSR delivery ratio
is around 30% whereas TRUST has a ratio of about 70%. This difference occurred
because the source nodes avoided the malicious nodes when doing their routing. Finally,
we see that OEDR is more reliable compared to OLSR. This can be attributed to the fact
that OEDR selects the MPRs in a dynamic fashion depending on the energy-delay
product. At one point, a node updates its MPR set due to changes in the residual energy
of its previous MPR. This results in switching to a cooperative node, thus unintentionally
avoiding a malicious node.

Figure 3. Packet delivery ratio
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Next, we examined the effect of malicious nodes on the average end-to-end delay. The
results are shown in Figure 4. We define the average end-to-end delay as the average time
it takes a packet to reach its intended destination. If a packet is dropped and another copy
is retransmitted, then the time is considered starting from the transmission of the initial
packet to the time a copy reaches the intended destination.


Figure 4. Average end-to-end delay
Our first observation is that the end-to-end delay increases in proportion with the
number of malicious nodes. Furthermore, notice that OEDR performs better than TRUST
when the number of malicious nodes is low. This is due to the nature of OEDR where
more emphasis is given to the delay when selecting the routes. Thus, the routes that are
intruder free decrease the overall end-to-end delay. However, when the number of
intruders increases, we see that TRUST performs better since it avoids routes that do not
forward its packets. Finally, OLSR has high delay compared to its counterparts due to its
static nature of selecting its MPRs. This difference, nevertheless, becomes marginal when
the number of intruders reaches 15 as the nodes have fewer options for routing the
packets around the uncooperative nodes.
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Next, we considered the case of mobility and the benefit of using RC packets on the
performance of TRUST. We show the results in Figure 5where five nodes were
randomly selected as malicious nodes. Note that the delay increases when the velocity
increases. This is due to the rapid changes in the network topology and the construction
of new routes. One interesting observation is that most of the added delay in TRUST is a
result of mobility only. OEDR and OLSR experience added delays due to the fact that
when a malicious node moves around the network, it can be selected as an MPR by
unsuspecting neighbors and thus their packets will be dropped. In the case of TRUST, on
the other hand, the reputation of the node is global and any attempt for it to become an
MPR candidate will be rejected based on its previous cooperation levels observed by
others.

Figure 5. Mobility vs. delay
The next simulation was to compare the overhead in the three protocols. We took the
ratio of control packets to the sent data packets in our simulation.
It is obvious from Figure 6 that the overhead for OLSR and OEDR fluctuate around a
constant value with a higher average for OEDR. This is because of the added content to
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the control packets in OEDR (energy and delay information) as well as the more frequent
topology updates in OEDR. Moreover, we notice that the overhead for TRUST is much
higher than that for the other two protocols. This is a direct result of the increased
transmission of RC packets throughout the network as well as the TC packets detailing
the new topology updates.
The results in Figure 6would give a false impression that TRUST is underperforming.
However, when this information is taken in conjunction with the packet delivery ratio in
Figure 3 we can see that the added overhead was the price for sustaining a higher
throughput in TRUST compared to the other two protocols.

Figure 6. Control packets overhead

VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a reputation model based on the Beta distribution function. The goal of
this work was to provide a method for MPR selection based on monitoring the traffic
activity in the neighborhood and using reputation reports given by other nodes in the
network. Experiments in ns2 show that a higher delivery rate was achieved using
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TRUST. Moreover, lower delays in both static and dynamic networks were observed.
The application of TRUST takes advantage of MPR usage just like in OLSR and OEDR.
However, the way the MPRs are selected in TRUST makes it more defiant to packet
dropping attempts.
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ABSTRACT
Key distribution in wireless sensor networks is challenging due to the lack of a trusted
third party. Several approaches for assigning the encryption keys to the nodes were
proposed ranging from using the same key throughout the network to assigning unique
keys to each pair of nodes. The former approach may lead to the compromise of the
whole network, whereas the latter results in the depletion of the energy, processing, and
memory resources of the network. Dynamic key distribution has been proposed as an
alternative for the pre-deployment of keys. In this approach, the keys are generated
through the collaboration of the nodes in the network. Each participating node sends a
partial key to a Head Cluster Head that later calculates the sub-network key and
distributes it to the participating nodes. The advantage of such an approach is that the
keys change frequently and adapt to the changes in the created clusters within the
network. Furthermore, the changes in the dynamic keys mean that the malicious
disclosure of the key will have limited effect on the network. In previous work, Energyefficient Hybrid Key Management (EHKM) was proposed for dynamic key distribution.
The protocols’ validity was shown through simulation. In this work, we implemented
EHKM and an extended version of it EEHKM on the UMR/SLU motes to get a better
understanding of how the protocol would behave under the actual constraints of hardware
that are not shown by simulation.
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Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network Architecture and Design –
wireless communication; C.2.2 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols – routing protocols.
General Terms
Security, Energy, Key Distribution, Hardware, Sensor Networks.
Keywords
Energy Efficient, Delay, Security, Key Distribution.

1. INTRODUCTION
The numerous applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have encouraged the
research in this promising field. Some examples of such applications are military
operations, humanitarian relief, and medical services. A WSN consists of a set of nodes
that collaborate with each other to guarantee proper communication between any node in
the network and the Base Station (BS).
Unlike wired networks, the nodes in a sensor network have no fixed infrastructure and
are limited in communication range. Moreover, they lack the abundant resources
available in wired networks. This dictates the use of energy efficient and resource
friendly routing algorithms.
The information in WSN is transmitted using RF channels which may pose a security
threat. This calls for security features to guarantee the confidentiality and authenticity of
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the data delivered to the BS. This is especially needed in situations where the nodes are
deployed in hostile environments.
The corner stone of security is the proper distribution and safe handling of the
cryptographic keys. Any compromise of a node or the way the keys are distributed can
affect part or the whole network. One approach for key distribution is to use
public/private key pairs. Although this option would provide reasonable security, it does
not serve well in WSN due to the lack of a trusted certification authority, the high energy
consumption, and computational expensiveness.
The use of shared keys can provide the needed security while maintaining the limited
energy and computational resources. One approach is to load the encryption keys into the
nodes’ memory before deployment. This may be done by using a global key shared by all
the nodes in the network [1], [2]. Alternatively, the nodes can be pre-deployed with
unique key pairs for every pair of nodes in the network. The former approach may be
defeated if one or more nodes are compromised which gives the attacker access to the
global key. The latter, on the other hand, is not susceptible to such a threat (a node
compromise can only affect the traffic of that node) but it is resource consuming. Each
node in a network of n nodes should store (n-1) keys for the pair-wise communications.
In [4], it is shown that the number of keys increases exponentially with the size of the
network. A tradeoff between the two approaches is to load the nodes with key rings
consisting of sets of random keys selected from a larger pool of keys. The ides is that any
two nodes in the network will share the same key with a certain probability p that
depends on the number of keys in the key ring and the total keys in the pool [3], [5].
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The use of dynamic key agreement is also proposed in the literature [12],[13]. Dynamic
keys have the advantage of reduced storage requirements compared to pre-deployed keys.
Moreover, the frequent changes of the keys limit the access of an intruder to them. In
[13], a protocol for dynamic key generation is presented in which a cluster key is
computed starting from the leaf nodes up to the Cluster Head. Every node in the group
uses the partial keys of its children as inputs of a function  k1  k2 mod p where p is a
prime number, α is the primitive root of p and k1, k2 are the partial input keys of the
function. The CH computes the cluster key and securely broadcasts it to the group.
In [12], a mechanism called Energy-efficient Hybrid Key Management (EHKM) is given
in which separate keys with different purposes are maintained by each node. These keys
are either pre-deployed or dynamically generated using a method similar to that given in
[13]. The goal of EHKM is to diversify the levels of security in the network since not all
the data on the network need to be handled with the same level of security. EHKM
enables the nodes in the network to operate in a low-security energy-efficient mode using
static keys, while dynamically creating keys for high security sub-networks.
Most of the key management approaches mentioned above rely on simulations using NS2
or GloMoSim. This may be useful in cases where the performance metrics of two
protocols are compared against each other. Nevertheless, these simulations do not give a
fair assessment of the behavior of the protocols when run on hardware. Energy
consumption, memory constraints, collisions and topology can be modeled in a simulator
but the value of simulating them would be only as good as the model given to the
simulator. The motivation of this research is to implement and evaluate the performance
of EHKM and EEHKM on hardware. This study serves two purposes. First, it identifies
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the effects of hardware constraints on the overall performance of the protocol. Secondly,
it gives a foundation for the improvement of the simulators. The actual testing results can
be fedback into the simulator through a modified network model that closely resembles
that of the hardware in terms of energy consumption and delay. This paper presents the
results of the hardware implementation of EHKM and a future paper will show the
modifications on the simulator and how it better maps to the actual hardware results.
2. OVERVIEW OF EHKM
The hybrid nature of EHKM is a result of running two different key management
schemes to handle the different keys along with their varying levels of security
requirements. Both dynamic and group wide distribution approaches are used.
EHKM assumes that the nodes will be safe from being compromised for a time Tmin after
deployment. Furthermore, it is assumed that the nodes form a sub-network whenever a
sensing event occurs and that the nodes know the number of nodes that are members of
the same sub-tree or the same level in the tree. Finally, it is assumed that the nodes
employ a self-organizing protocol for selecting the CH nodes such as OEDSR.
In EHKM, three different types of keys are used to support the various levels of security
and network applications.
Group-wide keys: Two group-wide keys are pre-deployed into each node. One key is
used for group wide communication between nodes that are not involved in the subnetwork (K1). The other key, K2, is used for the exchange of pair-wise keys as will be
explained later.
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Individual key: This is a unique key shared between the node and the BS for private
communications (K3). This key is also pre-deployed.
Sub-network key: This key is dynamically calculated whenever the nodes in the network
form a sub-network.
At the beginning of the operation of the network, the nodes start the process of sharing a
new random pair-wise key (Kr) to be used instead of K2 that is common to all nodes. This
needs to be replaced since the whole network may be compromised if a successful attack
on at least one node takes place.
To share the Kr, the nodes transmit KEY_HELLO messages that contains the node ID, the
new key encrypted using K2 and a MAC of <node ID, new_key>. Upon reception of the
KEY_HELLO message, a node stores the node ID and the new key in a table for future
use. Thus, at the end of this process each node will hold the key to be used to encrypt the
packets by simply referring to the key table using the destination node ID. After the
period of Tmin each node must clear K2 from its memory.
The sub-network key management protocol of EHKM is designed in a way to maximize
the efficiency of the energy consumption in the network. Here, the nodes collaborate with
each other to calculate a sub-network key. The main idea is that all the CH nodes
collaborate to select the CH with the highest average energy reserves in its cluster, i.e,
each CH calculates the average energy of all the nodes that belong to its sub-tree
according to

avg_energy(i) =  (E ij ) / n i
Where i is the cluster index and j is the node index with cluster i.

(1)
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These values are advertised to all other CH to select the one with the highest average
energy as the Head Cluster Head (HCH) according to
HCH = CH( max(avg_energy(i)))

(2)

The HCH in cooperation with the other CHs generates a dynamic key using partial keys
from the nodes in the network. The HCH checks whether there are sufficient nodes in its
sub-tree to generate the desired key. In case there are less than m nodes then the HCH has
to use keys produced by the members in the sub-tree of the CH with the second highest
average energy. This process is repeated until m nodes are chosen to provide the needed
partial keys.
The next step is to initiate the creation of the partial keys using a START_ALGORITHM
message sent from the CH to the nodes in the sub-tree. The message contains the cluster
ID and the depth metric which dictates the level that the message should reach within the
sub-tree before a partial key is created. If all the nodes in the sub-tree are required to
generate a partial key then the CH sets the depth field to -1. This is actually done in all
sub-trees contributing the m keys except for the last one in which the depth field is set to

d  m   nother _ clusters

(3)

Each node that receives the START_ALGORITHM message checks whether the depth
field is -1 or not. If it is -1 then it sends the packet to the leaf nodes. Once the leaf nodes
receive the message, they generate their partial keys and send them up the hierarchy to
finally reach the HCH. For the nodes in the last sub-tree in which the depth (d) is set to
some positive value, the node checks how many other nodes are at the same level within
the cluster and subtracts that number from d. If new value of d is negative then it does not
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need any more contributions from the nodes below in the hierarchy and sends its partial
key. Otherwise, it updates the value of d in the START_ALGORITHM message and
forwards it.
After the HCH gets all the m partial keys from the participating clusters, it calculates the
sub-network key and sends it out to the nodes after encrypting it using the new key (Kr)
of the destination node. This key will be transmitted m times and in each time it will be
encrypted with the key Kr of one of the nodes that participated with a partial key.
Following is a pseudo-code of the dynamic key calculation [12]
I. After creation of a subnetwork
Set cluster_heads = {Each cluster head}
For each cluster head
set avg_energy(cluster) = average(energy_in_nodes_in_cluster)
set ncluster = number of nodes in cluster
Set HCH = {Cluster head: max(avg_energy(cluster_heads)}
Set chosen_cluster_heads = {HCH}
cluster_heads = {cluster_heads} – {HCH}
Set m_temp = m - nHCH
while m_temp ≥ 0
CH_temp = {Cluster head: max(avg_energy(cluster_heads)}
chosen_cluster_heads = {chosen cluster heads}  {CH_temp}
m_temp = m_temp – nCH_temp
Set n_chosen = 0
Set depth = -1

87
while |chosen_cluster_heads| > 1
CH_temp = first_element(chosen_cluster_heads)
CH_temp broadcasts start_algorithm {Cluster_ID || depth}
n_chosen = n_chosen + nCH_temp
chosen_cluster_heads = {chosen_cluster_heads} – {CH_temp}
depth = m – n_chosen
CH_temp = only_element(chosen_cluster_heads)
CH_temp broadcasts start_algorithm{Cluster_ID || depth}
II. After hearing a start_algorithm message
If node is a leaf
Start_algorithm( ); return
Else
depth = received_depth – ni j (ni j is number of nodes in cluster i on level j)
If depth ≤ 0
Start_algorithm( ); return
Else
Broadcast start_algorithm{Cluster_ID || depth}
3. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF EHKM
This section gives an overview of the hardware implementation of EHKM. We present a
description of the capabilities, limitations and support for networking applications as well
as the actual implementation details on the BS and the UMR/SLU motes.
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3.1 Overview of Hardware and Associated Limitations
The hardware used was chosen to be energy-conservative, performance-oriented and of
small form-factor. For a low-power consumption, fast 8-bit processing and ease of
interface to peripheral hardware components, we chose the Silicon Laboratories® 8051
variant. With the external RAM, UART interface and A/D sensing, the microcontroller is
capable of performing various tasks done by sensor nodes. The Maxstream XBeeTM RF
module was used for communication.
To implement the algorithm on hardware, many limitations had to be taken into
consideration. The speed, precision and storage requirement all become factors in making
a decision on which microcontroller to use. For EHKM, the initial design goals were to
limit the energy consumption while providing a reasonable level of security. This was a
factor in our hardware implementation as the options of low-power consumption and
powerful 8-bit processor architectures are limited. Other factors that were considered are
the limitations on the available memory (since EHKM stores different types of keys) and
processing speed (encryption/decryption can be time consuming in some cases).
3.2 Sensor Node Hardware
The Generation-4 Smart Sensor Node (G4-SSN) was used to perform the functionality of
the sensor nodes in our hardware model. G4-SSN was originally developed at UMR and
updated afterwards at St. Louis University (shown in Figure 1). This node has several
abilities for sensing such as strain gauges, accelerometers, thermocouples, and general
A/D sensing. It is also capable of performing processing tasks such as analog filtering,
Compact Flash memory interfacing and 8-bit data processing at a maximum of 100
MIPS. Table 1 gives a summary of the specifications of the G4-SSN [9],[10].
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Figure 1. UMR/SLU G4-SSN
Table 1. G4-SSN specifications
Ic @ 3.3 V
[mA]
G4-SSN

35

Flash
Memory
[bytes]
128k

RAM
[bytes]

ADC Sampling
Rate [kHz]

Form-Factor

MIPS

8448 bytes

100@10/12-bit

100-pin LQFP

100

3.3 Implementation Details
EHKM extends the software architecture that was developed in [10] by modifying the
behavior of the nodes and the control packets they receive from the BS.
Figure 2 shows the software architecture of our hardware implementation which
illustrates the three layer approach that is used in this development. The various layers
provide flexibility since the layer specific details may be changed with minimal effect on
the overall system. The Application layer is responsible of handling all sensor data
processing. The Physical layer sets up the serial interface between the microcontroller
and the radio module. The layer in between is responsible of the queuing, scheduling,
routing, and message abstraction. Note that EHKM falls within the same layer but runs in
parallel to the sub-layers.
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Figure 2. Software architecture of EHKM
Before implementation, we considered the possibility of further enhancements on the
protocol. Our first observation is that it is resource consuming to distribute the subnetwork key using the unicast pair-wise approach described above. Instead, we propose
that a node encrypts the message containing the sub-network key using its own Kr. This
message can then be sent as a broadcast message and all the nodes in the sub-network
will be able to decrypt it using the key Kr of the HCH.
In addition to the existing packets in the routing protocol implementation in [10], we
added several packets that are sent either from the BS to the nodes or among the nodes
themselves. These packets are essential for the proper exchange of the various keys in the
network. Following is an explanation of the purpose of each packet.
START_KEY_EXCHANGE: The BS initiates the key exchange between the nodes at the
beginning of the operational lifetime of the network. This will mark the beginning of the
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period running for Tmin seconds. The nodes proceed with their key exchange upon
receiving this packet by sending a KEY_HELLO message.
KEY_HELLO: During the interval that starts when a START_KEY_EXCHANGE is
received and ends Tmin seconds later, the nodes in the network generate their new key Kr
to replace the old pair-wise key K2. The message will be sent to all one hop neighbors in
a broadcast mode in the following format.
Ni  all one hop neighbor: E K2 ( Node_ID, K r )
During Tmin, the key K2 is known by all the one hop neighbors and can be used to decrypt
the message. After Tmin the nodes will delete K2 from the memory and use Kr Instead.
START_ALGORITHM: This triggers the partial key exchange discussed earlier.
PARTIAL_KEY_EXCHANGE: Each node generates a random partial key and transmits it
to the node in the level above it in the sub-tree until it reaches the HCH that calculates the
final sub-network key.
SUB_NETWORK_KEY: After the final key is calculated it is sent to the sub-network
members in an encrypted packet. The message in EHKM will differ from that of our
Enhanced EHKM (EEHKM). For EHKM, the packet is encrypted m times using the key
Kr of the intended destination then transmits a unicast to node i (i = 0, 1, 2 …., m).
EEHKM, on the other hand, encrypts the packet once using its own Kr and broadcasts it.
The recipients of the message are responsible of decrypting it using Kr of the HCH.
Figure 3 gives a graphical explanation of how EHKM and EEHKM handle the various
packets for their operation.
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Figure 3. Packet handling in EHKM implementation
Table 2. Average % of routing energy and bit rate for the 3 cases

Average % Routing
Energy
Average kbps rate

OEDSR w/o

OEDSR with

OEDSR with

EHKM

EHKM

EEHKM

22.5

32.4

29.1

6.28

5.84

6.15

4. HARDWARE TEST SETUP AND RESULTS
We ran the Optimal Energy Delay Senor Routing (OEDSR) on the network under test.
The choice of the protocol has no effect on the operation of the key management
technique and is only responsible of routing the various packets within the network. The
sensor nodes employ 802.15.4 modules that transmit at data rate of 250 kpbs and
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interfaces to the node processor at 38.4 kbps. These modules run at a low-power of 1mW whereas the module connected to the BS transmits at 100-mW to extend its range.
The experiments were conducted on a network consisting of 6 nodes. The nodes
generated around 3.2 packets/sec with a packet length of 100 bytes of which 12 were
header bytes. The experimental cases were
1) Nodes using OEDSR with no key management.
2) Nodes using OEDSR with EHKM.
3) Nodes using OEDSR with EEHKM.
We measured the performance of the network in terms of end-to-end delay, throughput,
and percentage of overhead energy consumption.
The first experiment was run 10 times for each of the 3 cases to find the throughput and
the change in the energy consumption.
From Table 2 we notice the increase in the overhead energy consumption. This is
attributed to the added overhead of packets for the functionality of the key management
schemes. The other contributing factor is the encryption of the packets. We note that
EEHKM results in better energy management and this is attributed to the reduction of the
repeated encryptions and transmissions that were eliminated from the original EHKM.
As for the throughput, we studied the bit-per-second of data that were sent out. We
see that OEDSR with no key management gives a higher data rate but EEHKM is
relatively close to it while EHKM has the least throughput. This decrease in the
throughput may be attributed to the added overhead and the bottlenecks around the
CH nodes.
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Next, we studied the end-to-end delay to determine the effect of applying the EEHKM.
The results are given in seconds in Table 3. We notice that the application of the
encryption algorithm increased the average end-to-end delay by about 15%. This is
reasonable given the computations required with an algorithm such as the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). The choice of a lower cost encryption scheme such as the
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) can reduce the change in the delay.
Table 3. Average end-to-end delay comparison
Test

OEDSR w/o

OEDSR with

EHKM

EEHKM

Test # 1

0.1728

0.2013

Test # 2

0.1537

0.2711

Test # 3

0.1674

0.1792

Test # 4

0.1456

0.1628

Test # 5

0.1911

0.1813

Test # 6

0.1731

0.1623

Average

0.1673

0.1930

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Two key management protocols were implemented on hardware for performance
analysis. The study aimed at investigating the behavior of the protocol on hardware. The
results of this work can be applied to the existing simulation model for simulations of
different scenarios where a wide area or a high number of nodes is needed.
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There is always a tradeoff between applying security in the network and the energy,
delay, and throughput. This was the case in this study as we noticed a drop in the
throughput and an increase in the end-to-end delay and overhead energy consumption.
An increase of about 7% on the energy consumption and around 15% on the delay were
observed. These values are relatively low and may be acceptable given the added security
in the network.
The nodes demonstrated different behavior than that of what was seen in simulation. For
example, the effect of contention was clearly apparent in some initial test when all the
nodes started transmitting at the same time. We overcame that problem by setting a
random timer.
Our future direction with this work is to improve the random key generation. Currently,
our model runs a simple random generator which is clearly not a safe option from a
cryptographic point of view. We will investigate the use of an advanced random
generator such as the Pseudo Random Number Generator such as Fortuna. Another
aspect to be studied is the priorities given to key management packets. Currently, all the
packet flow through a queue while we believe that a more suitable implementation is to
assign higher priorities for such packets. Finally, we will develop attack scenarios and
traffic analysis techniques to study the effectiveness of this protocol.
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APPENDIX
CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE WORK
This work was motivated by the lack of sufficient studies dealing with link state routing
in wireless ad hoc networks. OLSR was taken as a case study and we found several
drawbacks in the initial proposal in terms of its energy awareness, end-to-end delay
reduction and sustainable service.
The goals of this research were set as follows:
1. Study the security risks and their effect on the performance of a network running
OLSR and OEDR.
2. Introduce an extension of the current protocols that involves trust levels to
mitigate these risks.
3. Analyze the reliability and survivability of the suggested protocol and its overall
effect on the network performance.
4. Implement a key distribution algorithm for wireless sensor networks.
In chapter I, we introduced TLR which is an extension that involves trust levels for
trusted routing in an ad hoc network. The chapter contributes with a better understanding
of the security threats facing a network designer and also suggests several methods to
overcome them. The chapter shows both analytically and through simulation that the
suggested extension results in an improved performance of the network in addition to the
added security.
Chapter II presented an analysis of TLR in comparison to OLSR. This analysis was based
on reliability and survivability. We applied the Markov analysis to the network and
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modeled the system with Markov graphs. This chapter gives the reader a deeper
appreciation of the enhancements achieved by using TLR.
Chapter III gave a different approach for handling trust in terms of the selection of relay
nodes in a network. It borrowed methods from statistical analysis and showed how they
can be used in running a network without any Trusted Third Party.
Finally in chapter IV, we implemented a key distribution algorithm for wireless network
on hardware. The G4-SSN motes that were initially developed at UMR were used for
testing purposes. We extended an existing key management scheme to efficiently use the
limited energy and memory resources.
The work in the four chapters of this dissertation has led to even more interesting
research ideas to be investigated. A few examples of these ideas include
1. A study of a dynamic approach for weight selection in the TLR cost calculation.
Currently, the model runs on two preset values that do not adapt to the network
conditions. A combination of the work in chapters I and III can lead to a better
identification of trusted paths which can help in dynamically changing the
weights based on the presence, or lack of, trusted routes.
2. The results achieved in chapter two can be fortified with real world data and
hardware tests using the hardware benchmark that was developed for chapter IV.
This form of testing can be used for practical comparison between the two
protocols.
3. The work in chapter IV will be used for network parameters measurement for
simulation enhancement. For example, by running the nodes and measuring realtime data such as energy consumption, delay, congestion, and packet drops, we
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can use that information to infer a better model to represent the nodes in the
simulator instead of the default model of NS2. This should help in having more
realistic simulation results and also can be used in cases when networks of large
size are to be tested. In such a case, the hardware implementation may not be
practical due to limited space, lack of sensor nodes for testing or difficulty in
setting up the test.
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